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111

PllEFACB

Charles Sand.~a ,etree,1 considered by many aa tne
leading philosophical genius ot ADlerioa. 1. one of the most

thought-provoking figures 1n American ph1losophy_

Antedating

James and Devey (1839-1914), hi. name 1. eclip.ed by
b~lght
wo~k,

~elr

11ghts because of his failure to publ1sh a oomplete
or even a slngle book, setting forth hi. ph1losophical

opinions.

'!'he crabbed manner of h1s a tyle, hi. tnabl11 t1 to

caM7 erandl0•• projects through to completlon, the tuclnatlon

ot new logical problem. and ontological oategori.s.. the •• are
among the faetor.'which .ake 'elrco'8 an endle ••1,. a tlmul at lng ,

leminal mind, and ,.et one that disapPOints and

barn ••

very moment When It s.ems about to re•• al. 1 tseU.
eltab11ah

h~.elt

at the

Unable to

1n a teaching posltlon tor more than a ,.e..

or two, he .pent the greater part of hl. lite working tor the
United states coast survey, dOing lome ot the moat brilliant
1 The fam1ly name vas spelled "Pora" when the or1ginal anoestor emigrated, and in many quarters 1t haa oont1nued
to bo pronounoed that vay_

iv

v

,oientifie work ot hi. day, for whiCh he i8 .till remembered. 2
His primary interest, though, lay 1n the fields ot logic and
philosophy_

His father, Benjamin Peirce, the foremost Aaerlcan

mathematioian ot his time and an inspiring teacher at Harvard,
trained Chulesso thorougbl,. that ha could latel' a.y. "He
eduoated .e, and i t I do anythIng it will be hi. work."
the tborough training by hi. father, ••peeiall,. in

Through

.a~atlc.,

Charle. "a. able to make .ignlficant progre•• 1n the tie1.4 ot

10glo, particularly 1n math&.mat1cal 10g1c, .nare his work .Iuper••ded that of 8001e in the .at1matioD ot sehrVder, .no based
muoh of h1.

t.

Vorla.!9ie~ ~

1mpro"elllenh ot Bo01.e

41. Algebra d!r LOllk on Peirce"

'7stem.

PeIrce'. reading 1n philosophy, al.o begun under tbe
direction ot his tather with who. h. "de.oted two hours a day .

to the atudlot !Cant' a Cr1tlc of Pure I'<.eaaon for more than
................

J

three ,.eara," until he "alma.' knew the whole book bJ h.art,·3

was supplemented by a study of LOCke, Berkeley, and Hume,

2 Paul wel.s, in the article on Charles Sanders
Peiroe 1n the Dlctlonat[ of American !lographl, New York, 1943,
XIV, 398-403, sIves £5. be.t aSori acoount or Peiro.'s llte.
This awumary i . indebted to h1m tor man,. ot 1 ta taota.
J CoUected papera ot Charles Sanders Peirce, edited
Oharl.s Hart.Eorn. an~ .'aul-W.I.a, Harvard, I9'1.I~jS, 1.560.
The volume. are entitled
tOllOW.8. I, prtncfile. ot Philoao~I II, Ele.ent. ot LOtiO' III, 1.iXact
!!ithematicaJ V, 'r'ii!!!-•• and praAiie _.' VI, sitin'E
0
Meta~h~.lo.. ThI. WGri, iblin wI~. referred to .8 ap, I.
11.! e Inlo nuabered parai.apha. Henoe all reterenc.;-vill be
by vo1Ul1le and »vuraDh. I:~60allm1ty1n1l Vol. I. Para. 1;'60.
by

a.

Liste, , tne-sm;.a!

...

st.

ollowed "'1 the acholaatics

allsburr, st. 1homas Aquinas,

Augustine, Abelard, John

nun.

Scotul, and Wil11am OelrhaDl.

eid, Hamilton, John Stuart Mill, Hegel, and Schelling

ame under hi. purview,

80

or

al80

It ean be ••1d that hi. acque.1n-

tance with the history ot philoaophy was sufficiently exten-

aive to have enabled him to evaluate Tarious po.ltions and
One ot the tirst fruita

scbools with a somewhat critical e,.8.

ot hi. study and reading ... a paper entitled "Hov to Make
Idea. Clear," published in the PSlular
which contain.d the first

pragmat1s..

Sci.n~~

our

Monthlz in 1678,

formulation, though not the name, ot

It was not . until 1698 that William Jamea popular....

ized the n.... ot pragmat1., but in

80

doing he aodltl.d it to

such an extent that 'eirce haatil,. rechristened hi. own doctrine
pragmatic is., a term which, he wrote, vas lIfug1,. enough to b •

• at. tromkidnapp.r. •• • 4
One factor that p"vented Peirce tl"Oll$ ex.roi.ing more
influence vaa hi. lack of a••oclation witB other intellectual

leader8 of the time.
vi th Nioholas

st.

In hla

earlle~

da78 he had a.aoelated

John Green, Ohaunoe., Wright, Francis Elling-

wood Abbot, and Will181'1'l J . .e..

But J.1e8 1s the only one of

his younger contemporarles with whom Peiroe ever became Inttmat.,?

&8

.S 'l'be personal "1a tiona betv.en the two men, as .ell
the philosophical influenoe ot Peirce un J .... , has been abl,.
h Barton ,.
in The Thou t d Character or

-

y11
even

~d

her~

Peirce had the trustration of seeing James, despite

18 10ye tor truth, holding the exact opposite of himaelf on
~any

~n

o

tund.ental lssue..

contralt to Jam.lt
ditterent

tr~

hi.

Pelrce lav hls own tolble8 ot character

"Who, tor example, could be of a nature
a8 I '

ae

concrete,

80

80

livingJ I

a

mere

~able ot $ontents, so abstract, ,a very anarl of tvine."6

ae retired rather early In lite to "the wllde.t county
Ion the
~.ar
~.

Northern state.," and bullt himself a large farmhouse

Milford, pennaylvania.

Here, except fOr occasional

leetur.~

spent the re.t of hi. 11te, devoting himself to his writing

on logic and philosophy.
~iting

He trled to make a 11 ttle mone,. by

all tne definitions on 10glc, metaphysicl, mathematlcs,

mechanlca, aatronom"

aatrology, welghts, measures, and univer-

.1tles tor several large dictionaries, along with book reviews
on a wide range ot toplcs tor the Nat10n.
,

llitb

All 1n all, he turned

out about 2,000 vords a day, with care and 1n a clear hand.

But

he failed to get a publllher tor the aeveral books he planned,
and in his diH poverQ- it vas William James who came to his aid
in hi. declining years.

B.J 1909 Peirce vas a very ill man ot

seventy, compelled to take. grain ot morphine daily to stave

ott pain.

-

~il1iam

1hrough hi. la.t tive year., although his original

lam•• , eoatont 193>, .sp. It chap. xxxii; II, lxxv, lxxvi.

6 CP, 6.184.5•• 6.182-184 tor a beautitul portrayal
ot Peiree'a .ii••• tor Jam•••

I""'"

viil
~ork

<II

was over, he continued with undiminiShed perslatency to

~aerk

many ot his tormer .ssaya..tormlng the letters with gre.t

diffIculty to judge trom the tremulous, painstakIng script.
In 1914 he d1ed ot oancer, a trustrated, iaolated man, stIll
working on his logic, wi thout a publisher, wi th scarcely' a
disciple, unknown to the public. at large.
Yet this is the man ot whoa. lactim"s Jamas wrote:
They are as "tlashe. ot brilliant light r.lieved agaiut Cimmerian blaCkne8s."7

Indeed, as more become acquainted with hle

ldeaa through the CoUected PaRer., the,. aubserlbe to the worda
of Morris Cohen:

"It philosophio eminence were measured not by

the number ot finished treatises ot dignitied length, but by the
extent to which a man bJtought foJttb new and truittul ideas ot
radical importance, O.S. Pelrce would e.al1,. be the greatest
figure in American philosophy_n 8

7 ':r~atII1Dl' a New Name tor Some Old !!!Z! or
Thinking, New YOI' , XI)07,-S-;- -

8 Quoted bJ Thomas A. Goudge,
Peirce, Toronto, 1950, facing p. 1.

l!!!.
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~IBLIOGRApgy

CRAPTER I

INTRODUO'fIOtf

Little exaggeration ls n•• ded to sa7 that no prOblem
baa caused !lore turol'. in the ph1losoph1cal world than that
tirat rala.d by Bo.thlua- Latln verslon ot porphyry'. Intro-

duction!2!2! categorl••

!! ~rl.totle

1n the tifth

c.n~1

I sball retu.. to ea7 conoerning genera and ap •• i8.
whether the7 subslat or whether they are placed in
the naked understanding. alone or Whether 8ubal.ting
the,. are corporeal or inco!'poreal, and wh. the!' they
are ••parated trom ••n.lble. or placed in ••n.ibl••
and in accord v1 th them. Que.tlons ot th1. 80rt are
most exalted busl!••• and require verr great 4iligenoe ot inqulry.
The implications ari81ng from the

V&l!'iOU8

solutions to this

pregnant que.tion have colored the historr of philo.oph,. through
the age., and. it i . largel,. On • phl108opher'. IntwpretatloD

ot this problem ot un1versals, or on his .tfmd in the controver8,.
between nomina118m and realism, that his philosoph,. will be
based.

It he bolds that genera and speCies rea117 exlst, he 1•

• realist, It he holds, on the other hand, that tney are mere
pames by whlch slmilar ind1viduals are deSignated, he 1s a nomi1 Rlchard MCKeon, ed. and trana., Selee tlona from
Medleval J?11108oPllers, New York, (1929], I, 91.
-

1

.,
2

nal18t.

Ano"'ther way of contrasting the two doctrines 1. this.

Realism 1. the doctrlne that genera and .pecle. are not mere
eonoeptlon.

or

the mind, but real things actually existing out-

side the mindJ nominalis. is the opposing doctrine that individual, particular objects alone are real.'

The hlstoPJ ot

philosophy haa been the hlatoPJ. or the ascendancy of one or
other ot the.e ide.s.

Setore any further progre •• i . made, a caretul di.tinction must, be noted, tor there are realism. and realisma.

Realis. 1. a term bridging two widely-varying tields, and it
is well to be ava!"e of this ditterenoe. ,Relli_ i . t"irst taken
as a doctrine oppoaed to idealia., namely, as stating that there

-

are thlngs whlch exist outside tbe mind.

secondl,., reall •• i .

a doctrine oppoaed to noaina11am, and it holds that the tbings

really existlng out.1de the m1nd are not .er8 .ingular., but
have aome 80rt of cOll1lNnl ty.

It i8 plain that the Acond t7J)e

ot" realiam 1. dependent upon the t"irst, tor it the:re were no
real thlngs glven, then
or CODDlUnit,' among them.

obYiou.l~

there would be no

gen.palit~

Thla the.i. i . primarily concerned

with real.lam in the aecond .ense a. opposed to nomlna11am, and
the other type vill be tOUGhed on onl,. •• neoe.s817 to prove

2 iti.nne Gilson, The un1tl ot Phl10S0!hlCal Experience, Je. York, 1947, 12. setiilao Fre1irlci eop esEon, 3:3.,
IJ:stO!7 .!! Philoaophz, westminster, Maryland, 19$0, II, 140..

3
..,

that peirce was working W1 th real things.
In the ancient Greek world philosophy was predominan t17 realistic, and this dootrine continued to hold 8va7
thrOughout the Middle Age..

S1nee then, however, and ••pecially

since the Renalssance, h"'Ul'Opean phlloaoph10l1 the whole h •• been

st.

nominalisti..

ThoDla. Aquinas had definitive17 and oonclu-

sivel,. •• ttled the controvers,. in tavor of real1.-.

In the

rourteenth centu1'1. hOV"er, there was a great outburst ot nomi-

naliSM under the leadersnip ot \V-illiam ockham.

Oakham'" dootrine

arose t1'Oll an appo.1 tion to Scotu8, tor be stated that the indi-

vidual contained nothing which v.a similar or common with aIV
ether individual.
real world.'

The universal. did not ex1st 1n an,.

wa,. in the

Nominalism, however, despite the tact that 1t was

allied in the controvers~ between Church and state with tn.

party opposing the .xc •• aive powers ot the pope and extolling
clvl1 government, a conn.etion which lent the philoaophical doctrine a factitious tollo_ing, never was able to take over the
field In the fourteenth
the

~enturJ.

One ot the main obstacle. to

earl,. apread of nominalism. waa the k.en scot1s tic thinkers,

all realists, who were 11). the predoa1nan; poei tiona
in the uni.ersitIe..
n

F.

or

authorIty

A oentury later, hovever,when scoti•• had

died out wltn the death ot the leading Scotl.ta, the humanist.

took over thelr chalrs In the universities.
Peirce has Shown how the vlctor1 ot the humanists
brought vitn it the nomin&118t1c phl1osophYI
'lbe humanists were weak thinkers. Some ot the.
no doubt might haYe been trained to be strong th1nker8J
but thq had no .evere trtUning in thought. All their
energies went to writing a olas.lcal language and an
artistic style ot .xpreuion. They went to the ancienta
tor their philosophy. and mostly took up the three
e.atest ot the ancient aects of philosoph,., Epicure.
anism, stoiclsm, and Scepticl ••• ~

As the.e three philosophies were all ba.ically nOttdnali.tlc,
there waa " .. tIdal wave ot nominalism.

nalist.
and

Locke and all hi. tollowing, Serkeley, Hartley, Hume,

even Reid were n01l1n&11.t..

nalist."S

Descartea was a nom1-

te1bnl. was an extreme nomi-

Theretore the history ot the last tour cent~lea

1a the story of the complete vlctorr ot nomina11sm.

aeglnning

as an attack on the Church, 1t was taken over by technical
ph110sophy. and tro.. phllosophy it apread until it had deployed
1tself on &11 the I,ront1er. ot mants dally exlstenoe.

solence,

of cour.. , vt. the fleld in whlch nomlnal11D1 found Its moat
enthuslastio

r.~eptlon.

WIth the penchan. for exper1mentatlon

whioh aro •• wi th Pr.... 1a Bacon, Kepler, GalUeo, and Copernicus
Culminating 1n tne nominalistic COSMology of Newton, modern acl.

4 ll, 1.1S.

-

S CP. 1.19.

.

• noe beca_.....or thought 1 thad be.olle-irrevocably aSloelated

wIth nominal18m. 6

'lhat this 1. not true wl11 be shown when the

positlon or Francis Ellingwood Abbot i . dlscu•• ed.
Nominalism, then, va. ...,eeping the f1eld and carrylng

all betore it in philosophY' and selenee.

The new thinkers weN

incapable ot the .ubtle thought. that would have been neceasarr
tor any adequate di.cu•• lon ot the tuestlon ot univeraala.

The,.

acc.pted nOminalistic vlews on the mo.t .uperlIc!.l grounds.
The age.old que.tion ot Boeth1us aoon became buried and put out
ot l'llght by nev que.tiona that overlaid 1 t, 11ke new papers on
an encumbex-ed 8tudy d••k.

real?

'eople no' longe:r asked,

Is it the aingular or unIversal'

.pecl•• '

What i8 the

The indivldual

01"

the

This whole problem gave -*7 to the cr1t1cal question

whtch the medieval. would never hay. bothered ask1ng beeaua. he
took it tor granted,

How 1. knowledge po •• ible at

This waa the atate ot

artat~s

all,7

at the time ot Kant,

who vas the 10glcal outgrowth or nominaliam.

How thIs develop-

ment took place can be polnted out brIet1,.. ' The essence ot
nominal! •• is the

doot~1n.

that univer.als corre.pond to nothIng

really exlstent outslde the mInd" but are eIther mere emptJ
6 Se. J .... Felbleman, ~e Revival ot Reallsm,
Chapel Hill, North Cvollna, 1946,-n-X&.
,
7 ThIs point va. made by C.R.S. Harris In Duns scotus"
VoL III ~. Philos22h1cal Doctrines ot Dun. Scotu., ditora a£
the clarenlon :Preel, 1ft1. 1&.
--

6
names

01"

n .... denoting subjective concepts. 8 I'ominall_ tbua

distinctly anticipated the Kantian critical philosophy in reterring the _oure. ot all seneral conceptions (and thereby ot
all human knowledge), not to the object alone, or to the object
and 8ubject together, but to the subject alODe, it distinctly
anticipated the doctrine that

~thing.

conform to cognition, not

cognition to th1nga. n9 Since universals are classiticatioDa

or

things based on their suppo.ed r ••••blanc.. and ditterence.,
the denial ot all objective reality to universal. i . the denial

ot all obJeotive reality to the suppo.ed re.aablanc •• and ditter.nce. ot things th••• elvesJ.the denial ot all knowl.dge of
the relations of objects is the denlal.ot all knowledge ot the
objects related, and thi. denial is tantamount to the assertion
that things-in-the.s.lve. are utterly unknown.

Thus Oakham wa.

merely a nominalistic predece •• or ot Kant, who, 1n h1. turn,
pushed the lack of corr••pondence betw.en the logiC ot concept.
and the tacta ot the external world to a oonstItut1onal InabI11ty
to brIdge the gap.10

Kant .1noe ha. swung all sub.equent specu-

latIon into nominal1stic channels) and all ot modern phIlo-

8 Albert stVcki, G••ehichte der Philosophle de.
Mittelalterl!' MaIns, 186S, II, 962.
·9 Thu. argue. Prancia Ellingwood Abbot in ScIentifIc
Thei .., 2nd ed., Boston, 1886, 3-4.
Pa!"1a,

10 Auguste Brunner, S. J .. ,
268.

Q.9411,

~

Conn.ia.anee Hu:maIne,

...
• ophy, insofar as it 1. based on Kantlanism, may

7
be

said to

rest, by tacit agreement, upon the nominalistic theo17 of universals.
Kant therefore not only espou.ed nominalism, but even
went turther and set up an idealistie philosoph,._

Although a

reaction waa felt againat Kant And hi. immediate IUOCe •• or. almost at onc., it took some

ideas in logioal torm.

t~e

tor philosopher. to work out tne

To repair the damage done by Kan t, ideal-

la. had first of all to be refuted and the .xi.ten•• ot real
things outslde the mind again established.

Thomas Reld was the

leader of this movement, and although not of the philosophio
.tature of the Sage ot }thig_bers, he produoed an etteot on
philosophy wnich haa eventuall,. been ot extreme importanc ••
Reid re.tored the reality of the mind, against Hume, and ot that
which the mlnd knows, the .xternal world, including both sub.tanee and all posslbilities, agaln.t Kant.

Thus, although. Reid

dld not go all the way and evolve a theory of universal., he did
open the wa,. toward re.lism again br vindicating the .xi.tenc.

ot real Object., and thereby made a theory ot
sible again.

uniy.~sal.

pos.

Hia influence during the nineteenth oenturoy waa

not great, although it was then that he lett hi. impress on the
moat important of American realist., Charles sandera ,eirce. ll

11 James F.ible~, An Introduction to Pelrce'.
!hl1oao2hl, New York, (). 946.J. 4~.
'-

8

...

A' i. evident, more will be .een ot Peirce"

oontrlbution to

the oause ot real1sm 1n the following page ••
Fundamentally, though, the reaction to nominalIsm
ha. a much more radical cause than the oppos1tIon of a school

ot realist philosophers.

The reason

Why real1am.ls assuming

a widenIng .phere ot importance. i. that oontemporary scientists
and philo.ophers are diseov.ring that the pr.supposition for
which th-.y had thought nominalism was • ne•••• ary condition 18
tals..

What is th1s pnsuppos1tlon'

It i8 that empiriCal.

acience is ••••nti.lly na.inali.tio and requires a metaphysios
and .pistemology balled on nomina11_ tor its foundation .tonea ..

scientist. the.selves haVe ahown,.how.ver, that emplrical. aelence i, not based on nominalism,l! lnd••d, d • .,lte ~at .clentists may protess a. their philosophy, they are es.entialll
realists When thel turn to their sciences.

This i8 the burden

and theme ot the Introduction to Abbot'. Soientitic Thei ••,
I

a book tor whioh Peirce oan Deyer tind .uttlclent prai.e.
Abbot tirst argues that modern philosophy hal been overshadowed
by the blight ot nominalta. l ) Following this there 18 an acoount of the hi.torr ot the variou.s type. ot realism, ranging

t2 william stanley Jevona, !he prinOll18. ot Solence,
a Treatl.8 on Loale and Sclentific MetliiW, 'Ii'id e., London,
.
Y881, 8-9. A180 Johil'!iii(!.lI, 'fill:;.!!l! Elect:r1cltl. New york,

0.1872, 60.61.

13 Abbot, Scientific 'lheiem, 1-14.

9
t~o.

Plato f •

ext~.me

re.11s. to Abbott, own tOeorr of relationiam

wh1ch he wishes to eatabllah. 14 Next AbbOt proves that, While
phIlosophy became nominaliatic attar the downtall ot scholasticism, .cienoe has been and 1s e .. antially opposed to that
doC trine. IS

poai tlon ls neatly ,llnmlari.ed in th$

Abbot"

tollowing paa,agel
Solence 11 to-day challenglng emphatically the
verr foundation of both a ,riori and a eo.tertari
philosophies. and the ohil-enge is none t5. te ••
menaoing Or deep-toned, because it haa bean hitherto
uttered in d.ed ~ather than in word. She denie'l
not by a theoP,1 a. yet, but by the erection of a
va.t and towering editlce of .erifled objectlve
knowledge, that genera and .peole. are devoid of
objective reality, or that general terms are destitute ot objective correlates. ahe d'niea that No.inalia haa rlghtly 80l.ed the problem ot univ.paUs,
when that solution would in an Instant, it conceded,
swap away all that aha haa won t-rom Nature by the
aweat of hel' brow. Her ..,el!7 exiatence 11 the abundant vindication ot Relationi __ , aa the Itable and
8011a roungat10n or real knowledge ot an objeotive
univ.rae.J.
Abbot 1n hi. book expounds the nec.ssity ot philosoph7 "oatch1ng
up" with scienoe.

ae want. the queen ot the acience. to tormu-

14 Ibid., 1,5-29. Hia theo17 wiU be presented 1n
aome detail tn-miipter 1br.e. Very bJ'iefl,., hovever, relation1am, or relational realism, is a theory which teaohes that universals aJ"e, first, objective relationa of resemblance among
objectivel,. extst1ng th1ngs, se cond 1,. , subjective concepta or
the•• relat10nl determined 1n the mind b1 the relationa th~
aelves, and, thirdly, name. representative both or the relations and the concepta, and applicable alike to both.

15

-

Ibid.,

-

29-S5.

16 Ibid., 36.

10

late explicitly the ~eallstic suppositions on which modern empirical soience 1s bas.d:
Scienee has aChieved all ita marvellous triumphs
by practically denying the rundamental principle laid
down by Kant. an~ by practically proceeding upon its
exact opposite, and it is a scandal to phIlosophy that
she haa bot yet legittmated this practical procedure,
overwhelmingly justified as it is by its incontrovertible results. The ti•• hal come tot' philosophy to
revers. the Roscellino-Kantian revolution, and ~iv.
to .cience a theory of knowledge which shall render
th. SCientific method, not practicall,. successtul
(fot' t~,t it already ia), but theoreticallJ impregbable.
It is plain that Abbot was one or the ear11 heralds of the modern
return to realiam..
But what doe. all this have to do vi tb Peirce'

What

bearing doe. the .edieval oontrover.J OVer realism and nominalism have on hi. philosophY'

These are questions upon Which

this thesis will attempt to throw some light.
A. tor the problem of universals, at least Gne troportant

philosophe~

i8 disinclined to view 1t .s exclusive property

ot the Middle AS•• , but rather states,

"I think PeIrce was

right in regarding the reallst-nom1nallst oontroversy as one
which is still undeCided, and which 1s as important now as at
any tormer time.- 1S Peiree himself "declared tor realism,"
and although he had "sinoe very caretullJ and thorougblJ

18 Bertrand Russ.ll in Foreword of An Introduction
toP.iree's fhilosophy by J'am4lls Feibleman. u . - ·
'

11
revised" hli philosophical opinion. "more than helt a dozen
times, and had m.odified them more or less on lIOst topics" J
,till he had "never been able to think dI.f'feren tly on that
que.tion of nOll.1nallll'11 and 1"e&.11 ... "19
the nominalism ot modern philosophy he

As a 1"_8<17 agaInst
~sested

a return to

.cholastic realIsm, particularl,. that of nuns seotus.

1hU8

he

writes 1n 1897:

The work. ot Duns Scotus have atrongly influenced
It hi. logic and metaphys!ca, not slavishl.,. worahlppld,.but torn away trom ita medievali., be adapted
to modern aul writ, under contInual whole.ome reminders
of nominalistI0 crItiCisms, 1 am convinced that it
will go tar toward supplyIng the philosotay which is
beat to ha~n1z. with phJsioal aolenoe.
.me.

Peirce too had his tona ot the problem of univeraal ••
He "a••• no objection to defining it as the que.tion ot which
i. the beat, the laws or the taot. under theae lawa."21

que.tion "18 as pre8sing tod., as eve. it was. R22

Thi.

That Peirce

respected Abbot'. crItloism of nominal! .. may be gathered fro.

these atatements,
Dr. Fnnoi8 Ellingwood Abbot in the very remanable

IntltOduction to his book entitled "Scient1t!e Thei8m"
Cleesj abowed on the contra17,: "quite o()nclu81ve1y,
that selenee has alva,.. been at heart realistic, and
always _at be ltoJ and upon comparing his wrl tinge

19
20

21
22

OP
-'

1.20.

-CP, 1.6.
4.1.
-Ibid.
ep,
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with mrne, It Is 8.8117 aeen that these reatures ot
nominalia. which I polnted Qu t in sclence are merel,.

supert!clal and transient. 2~

Agaln peirce says:
:Dr. (P. E;) Abbot In his Seientific 'l'be1sM [l88s)
has 80 clearl,. and with such .a.lraS! ••Implic1t,.
shown that modern acience 11 realistic that It is
perhaps inJudioious tor me to attempt to add an,.thing upon the subject. ret I shall trr to put It
into auch a lIght that it may reflect aome ral4 upon
the worth or worthle •• neaR ot detached ideas.

It i . quite evident that Peirce believed himaelf' to be a
realist, and Indeed, to have gone back to Sootus tor the basl.

ot his rea11,tlc theory.

In this thesia the reall$m of' Peirce

will be further inve.tigated to flnd out

~.ther

he is really

a sohol.stic realist, as <11e '0 otten clalmed, or vhether he
tollows the relation!.m ot Abbot.
ean be solved, anothe,.

ot the reall.-

or

-CP, 4.1.

1.20.

-

24 CP ,

mU8;t

tirst be taken

Upt

that

P.1rce, it. relatIon to hIe sources, and hls

us. ot h1. sources.
23

q~l~st!on

But betore thl. problem

...
CRAPTER II
PEIROE'S PRO!ESTAT!ONS OF REALISM
It .. phUoaopher 1s to have a realis tic philosophy
based on universals, then quite obviously he must rejeot nom!.
nalism somewhere along the line.

Therefore, betor. entering

into a discussion ot the realism which Peirce found to be consequent upon the acceptance ot the three categories,

~hiCh

i.

a kind ot Aristotelian1s., "ot the scholastio wing, approaching
scotisnt, but going much turther in the direction ot soholastic
realis.,·1 it will be well to consider brietly Peirce f • arguments against nominalism.
NominalisM, Whlch is tor Peirce the bellet that

"l!!!

and general tzp!8 are flgments of the mind,fl 2 hold. that

particular tacts or events are the only realities.

Since the ..

eventa must be understood, it is usetul to record them by mean.

ot abstract expressIons.

Some ot the latter, $Uch as the laws

ot motion, summarize the way in which certain events have tollowed one another.

-

Other Itatementa, .uch as "hardness" or

lOP, 5.77n.

-

-

2 CP, 1.16.

13

-lntelligen6," summarize What haa been found to obtain in
numerous individual instance..

All these abstractions are mere-

ly convenient device. wh10h have no other purpose apart trom the
role they play in knowing.
world.

'e1ree, 1t

i.

They designate noth1ng 1n the natural

evident, include. under the one oategol"7

ot nominalism both the extreme .nominalists who argue that ab.tract terma are nothing but words, and the conceptualists who
admit that abstract terms are meaningful word. which d.signate,

however, purely mental conoepta.

Conoeptualis. i8 but another

torm ot nominali8m, and the only re.son that conceptualist,
have tried to maintain that their posItion 1. independent ot
nominalism is the1r "loole and slapdash atyle ot thinking *hat
has made it poasible tor them to remain nominalists.")
reality conceptual1 .. 1s noth1ng but a muddle-headed

In

to~

or

nominaliam.

FrOm the Tantage point at hi. realism 'eirce kept
nominalism under oontinuous tlre tor many years.
toward it verged close to oontempt.

Hia attitude

"Modern nominalists are

mostly superficial men. n4 any one of whom reminds 'eirce of
the blind spot on the retina, "so wonderfully doe. he uncons.ioualy smooth over hi. field ot vislon and omit tacts that
stare him in the tace, while s.eing all round them wi thout per-

-

3 qp, 1.27.

4 CP, 5.312.

15
oelving any~gap 1n his vlew ot the world. a5

El••wbere he .a,.,

that "nominalist. oannot reason about Intinity. because they
dO not reason logically about anything. a 6 Such 18 hi. antlpathy
to the doct.lne that he even disapprove. ot

s~otu.

becau.e of

an Inclination to nominalism, d••pite his otherwise high e.te ••

ot the Subtle Doctor. 7
Felbleman haa divided 'elrce'. arguments agalnat nominallsm into four cla.aitications, according a8 they are taken
a) from logic, b) fram metaphysics, c) tram psychology, and d)
trom science.

A. he hims.lf conced•• , however, "the •• are very

rough dlvisions, tor the arguments enade ott almolt impercept.
lbly into one another_aS

T.heretore, rather than give a~ent.

trom eaoh ot the.e tonts, a typical tew wl11 be selected to
,how what Peirce"

mind on the que.tion vae, tor, aa Feibleman

points out 1n another vork, ,elroe "aav the contradiotion whioh
makea nominall •• untenable, th&t sinoe nominaliam allows no
universal principl •• 1t cannot allow Itaelt, ainoe It too 1. a
universal pr1nc1ple. a9

-cP,

5' cP, 4.1 ..

8

- 1.165.
1.560.
-CPt
Introduction

9

~

6

7

~

Revival g£

'eirceta Philosophy, 173.

R.ali~,

34.

16
'!'hi tiz-at arg\teent ahows that nominalism makes
imPossible not only id.ntity but a180 81m11az-1ty:
NOW, upon the nominalist1c theOl7'i there 1.8 not only
no absolute or uu.er1cal identlty. but ~ere az-e not
even an,. r.al a6ft.ementa ot 11kene.aea between indivIduals, tor likeness oonsists me%'817 1n the oalling
of several individuals by one namf& or (in lome 878tems) in theiz- exoiting one Idea.
~ls nominalistic hypotheais

likenesa

'~ut.

whiCh denie. real agreement or

ott all reaBoning and commun1cation, i t true,

it would make all human discourse, which is based on identlt1'

and ditterence, impossible and would prohibit all planning.
?bat it 1. not true 1. aftlrmed b1 the ex.1stenee or suoce ••rul
reasoning, communicatIon, dilcourae, and planning.
Another argument can be taken trom the reality of

abstz-act:fona, tor "the citadel of nominaliam" will fall eaa,.
v1ctim to tho.e who "have once l10unted the ventag ....point of
the logie ot re1at1v.s.,,11 which "ahows that the introduction
of abstl"actions-whlch the nominalista have taken aueh delight
in ridiculing--i. of the greatest aerv1ee in nec ••• ary Intereno •• - 12 The argument is long, but contains an illustration
uaed otten by pe1rce and h1s oommentators:
It i8 very

11

12

ea.,.

to laugh at the old phyalcian 'Who Is

4.1.
-CP,
CP, 4.611.

-

17
represented as anewering the quest lon, why oplum puts
people to al••p, by saylng that It 18 because It haa
a dormatlve virtue. It ls an anawer that no doubt
oarr1 •• vagueness to lts 1a8t extreme. Yet, invented
a8 the storr was to Show how 11ttle meaning there

mlght be in an abstraction, nevertnelesl the phyalcian t a
anawer 40es contain a truth that modern ph1losophy haa
generall,. denled, it do•• aa.ert tnat there really 1.
in opium somethi5 which explains i t8 always putting
people to .leep. This hU, I aay, been denied by
modern phllolophers generally_ 50t, ot cours., expli01 t17J but when the,. aal that the dltterent events;
of people going to sleep atter taking opium have
:really nothing In oommon, but ont7 that the m1nd
cla•• e8 them together--and thls la What they vi ....
tually do .a.,. in deny1ng the reallty ot generalathey do implioltly deny that there 18 any true .xPlanat!Qnot opium'S generally putting people to
ale.p. ,J

This passage

~ows

that nominali . . i& tal.e 11'1 denylng that there

i. any ....n •• s 171111 unCl.tneath a1al1a:r things 01' .vent. 1n the

world.
NQ81nall •• oan be retuted troa psyohological ground.
In this .anner:

.& an 1ndividual.

lIoalnall_ hold. that .",e:ryth1ng 1. known

and that theN 1. no reason tor two

thing.

giving the same Idea to the mind (8ince the,. do not tund.entall,. contaln the foundation tor a oommon ld.a).

'eirce, however,

while admitting that e",et'1th1ng that we know 18 m.ental, ne.erthele'a .alnta1ns that what 1. known by the mind o:rlginate. not
in the mind but ln the objective world.

!hus the relatlona,

or universals, ot Which w. have knowledge, exlst Independently,
a. is evldenced by their .tubbornn••• and Intractablilty. that

...

r r

13 CP. 4.234.

18

...
1', by the tact that every mind nec.s.ar117 draws the same
Ideas trom l1ke things.

In hi. own worda.

All human thought and opinion containa an arbitrary,
accIdental elament, dependent on the l1mitatlons In
circumstancea, power, and bent ot the indIvidual,
an element ot error, In short. BUt human opinIon
universally tend. In the long run to .. definite torm,
Whioh i. the truth. Let 8n7 human being have enough
intONation and exert enougb ~t. upon &nJ' que.tio1'1. and the re8ult vll1 be that he will arrive
at •• ertain detinite conclu.lon, which 1. the .ame
that &n7 other m1nd will reaoh under suffioiently
tavorable clroum.t.nce •• l~
Nominalism. cannot admit an 818men t In thIngs eich would toree

all minds to derl..... imilar Ideas trom them.
Thi.
by

w.a

80me

taken

~

tl'ODl

ot PeIrce"

ar,~.nts

the evidence ot .clenoe.

oan

be

concluded

Although Peirce

a reali8t b7 at 1••• ' 1811,15 he do •• not •• em to have

comprehended the realism. ot seienoe until atter reading the
introductIOn to Abbott. Sclentlt!! ....
'lh_._i..._.... , which did not appeap
until 1885. 16 At any rate, atter that time he u.ed thi. ammu.
nit1011 al.o 111 hi •••• ault. upon nominali...

"Ph7.1oal aelen08,"

•

14 Charle. Sanders Peirce, "RevIew ot Alexander

Campbell Fraser'. Edltlon ot the Works ~~;org, Berkelex,"
The North American Rey!e", exI!I lI811),
. •
•

15 Hl. review ot Jra••r'. Berkel't give••uttioleni
prOff or thl.. aetore tre.t1ng ot serietey 1m.elt, Pelree
apends ten page. rri1e,,1ng the v1c18si tude. ot reall_ through
the later 'MiddleA8ea and following perlod ••
16 OP. 1.20. "Upon comparing h1. (Abbot. ao wr1tlns
wlth mine, it I i e•• 117 .een that the.e teature. ot nominalism
¥nich I pointed out In .elence are .erely .uperlieial and
tran.ient."

19
p8irce

.tate~

,-eal1am. tt 17

tn 1902, "glves ita as.ent • • • to scholastic
A tev years later:

ttAtter physical science haa

di.covered so many general prinCiples in Nature, nominalism
becomes a disgraceful habitude ot thOught. nlB Againz
No mistake oan be greater than to suppose that ockhami.tlc thought i8 naturally allied to the conceptions ot modern soience. it is anti.scientific in
••• ence. A scientif10
Whose onl1 metaphysic.
has been .uch ... hi. own studi •• have suss••ted vill
be detinitely adver •• to the Ide.s of Ockham. and.
so tar •• his simple oonceptlon. go, will agree with
seotue.1'l

man

Nominalism i8 lastly inconsistent with acience because it delib-

erately blocks ott the road ot

inqui~,

which it is prect ••ly

the function and a1m ot sclence to keep open.

-It ls one ot

the peculiaritie. ot nOD11nall_ that 1. is continually supposing things to be absolutely inexplicable_ H20

Aocording to tne

nominalists, "we co.e up, bump against actions absolutely unintelligible and inexplicable, where human inquiries have to stop.H2
NOW that it haa been shown how Peirce explicitly re-

jected nominalism, an explanatlon ot hi. own system ot realism
1s in order.

The task wl11 not be eaay, tor as one author

17 CPt 6.)61.
18 CP .. 6.175.
19
20

-CP,

2.166.

elP"

1.170-

-

21 lbid.

'" ,
20

points out .... "In spite ot this volwu.1nousne•• it is amazins
that a olear or conci ••• tatement of his realis. is not to be

round in his wrlt1ng•• ,,22 Neverthele •• , it the problem 1s
attacked in the way that Peirce saw it, it aay at least set
the que,t1on In .. clearer llght it it does not render the
actual task ot del1neat1ng hi',reallam so.ewhat e.sier.

The

method, then, tnat Peirce used to get at reality, namely. his
phena..enolo8Y and oategorles, must be explained.
Metaphysica, Or the acienoe that govern. a realistic
philoaophy, must, aocording to Peiroe, rest on observation:

Metaphysios, even bad metaphysios, really rests on
observationa, whether conscloual'1 or- not, and the
only r-eason that this 1. not unlver-sallT reoognized
i . that 1t relt. upon kinds of phenomena wi tb. which
every man'. exper1enoe i . 80 saturated that h. usuall,.
pay. no partIcular a ttentlon to them. The data ot
metaphysics are not les8 open to observation. but
imnaeaaurably more 80, than the data. au, ot the veXT
highly developed seienoe ot a.tronaml. cJ
It the dependence of metaphysics on ob.ervatlon were bettav
known, the system Itself would be more patent to the observer.
Hene. phenomenologJ {or pbanero.ooP1 a. Peiree variou8ly name.
It} must be the f1rst atep toward. a realism, as it i. b,

phenomenology that one
ot

~lh.nomenologIJ

t.

ob••rvatlon 1. sharpened.

The purpose

or the Dootr1ne of categories • • • 1. to

22 JU.tU8 BUehler, Charl •• '.ircets Em21riola.,
London, 1939, 123.
23

-el,

6.2..

2l
unravel the tang1e4 skein (ot] all that in any sen•• appears
and wind 1 t into distinct tOl"lUJ

02"

in other words, to Blake

tlbe ultimate analysis ot all experiences the tirst task to

wh1ch philosophy has to apply 1t8.1t."24 Phenomenology 1.
that "pl'el1min&J7' inqu117" which i . aimed preci ••ly at aiding
• person to beoo.e conscious

o~ ~at

h. observe., it 1s a

".olenoe that do.s not dra. any d1stinotion. of good and bad
in any ••na. whatever, but ju.t contemplatea phenomena u

they

are, 8impl,. opena It. ey•• and d.scrib.s what it .... , not what

1t a.e. in the real a. distinguished trom tlgment.....not regarding

an, such

diehot~--but

s1mply describing the object, .a a

phenomena, and stating what it tinda 1n all phenomena alike ... 25
The subject matter of phaneroacopy 1s the phaneron, or pheno-

menon, which 1s "the collectlve total of all that i8 in any
way or ln any aen•• present to the mind, quite regardl.s. ot

whether 1 t oorNsponds to any real thlng or not ... 26 As students ot phenomenology, then, all w. have to do

i8 simply open our mental eyes and look well at the
phenomenon and .ay .nat are 'he oharaoteristlcs tnat
are never wanting in it, ~.ther that phena.enon be
.~.th1ng that outward experlence tore •• upon our

attentlon. or whether it be the wild.at of dreama,
Or wh.ther it be the most aba'Not and sen.ret]. ot

-

24- .2!, 1.280.

25
26

-

CP,

5.37.

CP. 1.264,.

22
the conoluslon. ot a01.no •• 27
The phaneron. or object of phenomenolog. 1. not
.omething .ubJeettve, such •• would be expreased by the English

Por 1dea
,eirce wlahed to
word idea.

has a p.,.oho1ogieal oonnotation whioh

avoid.

olear trom thil tactt

That the phan.ron 18 not
In the

nO suoh idea" as this or that,

definitely des.rib.d.

~er,.

un.

In

idea 1.

breath ot laying "tnere 1.
phaneron 1n que.tion i.

Pelrce in 1898 reprimanded HUllerl tor

having hopele.aly tied up the foundationa ot hi. phenomenology
in psychological oomplicationa , although both men.gree that

phenomenology 1s an attempt to tocul attention on the universal
or ••• entia! elements ot the Phenomena.

28

, Phenomenology, then. 18 not a subject1ve lo1entH9J nOr
11.1 1 ta prjJ'IUlry concern ,,1 th the real.

aut 1t the.. two po •• lbi-

11tl •• are preclud.ed, Just where doe. one' a lntereat l1e 1n
atudy'lng the ao1ence'

1'be phenomenolog1st 1s ••eking to gener-

alise the direct observations he has mad., to signaliae ••vera1

27

CP, 5.41.
-Frank
'.!hilly, A

28
H18to~ or PhilosOPBl, revi.ed by
Ledger Wood, New York, o.9Sld, S~~:o 0:- I.e 0', '4.7, where
Peirce .ay. that BUsserl ia one or those vrit.~. ot our genepation who, Matter underscored pPOte.tationa that their diacourae
shall be ot logic exclus1vely and not by any means or paycholog7
(almost all logiCians protest that on t11e), forthwith become
intent upon those elements of the procesl ot th1nking wh1ch
leem to be speeial to a mind like that ot the human race, as ve
~ it, to too great neglect ot those elementa which muat-oel . . .
a. muili to anyone as to 81'11' other mod. ot embodying the a ...
thought. ft

23
...

•• ry broad claaaes ot phenomena, describing the features ot each

with the result that, altnough they will be seen as lnextricablr
1I1xed together, yet their characters will appear manIfestly
qui te disparate, as they tall under a short list ot b,aad cate-

gorles. 29

ae i8 t17ing·. to aart out the phanerons into their

indecOmposable elements, ehloh can be done in two ways:

81thflr

according to the form or structure ot the elements, or accord1ng

to their matter.

Att_. two years ot labor on the latter P8irce

••certained that a division according to the matter was beyond
his powers, wheretore he divIded the phenomena into oategorie.
according to their sttr\4oture.'O

Even this 1. not an e..,. task,

however, :for three faculties in pal'"t1culat' are required in order
that one may ob.en. correctly what 1s presented to him..
first ot these i .

~the

faculty

or

'!hat

.eeing vnat stares one in the

face ft , .econdly, the faculty ot "resolute discrimination which
tastens itself 11ke a bulldog upon the partlcular feature that
ve are studying, tolloW8 1t wherever lt may lurk, and detects
1i beneath all ita di.gu1.e."J t1nall,., the tacult,. whioh con-

ter. ftthe generalizing power of the mathematio1an who produoe.
the abstract tOl'Dlu].a that comprehend. the ve'1!1 easence of the

feature under examinat10n purifled trom all adm1.xture ot extra-

-

29 CP, 1.266.
.30

-CP, 1.268.

neoUS and irrelevant aocompaniments.- 31
When William Jamel complained ot

un.

novelty ot the

three categorle •• ,e1rce admitted that perhaps he did not have
the

clea~at

not1ons posaible ot th«ml

It rather annoys me to be told that there il an,....
t.~lng novel in m., three categorie., tor it they have
not, however cantu.edt." "en recognized b7 men line.

men began to
make them a.
ls, however,
are 80 in M7
their nature

think, that condemns them at once. To
distinct a8 it is in their nature to be
no small talk. I do not suppose they
own m1nd} and eVidently, it 1s not ill
to be aa sharp aa or~1nar., concepta. J2

However, "the three oategories are supposed to be the three
kinds ot elements that attantive perception Cad make out in
the phenomenon.·)) The.e three indecomposable elements are
called by Peirce quality, tact (or reaction), and law (or representation).

They are aleo known in hIs writings as monad,

dyad, and trlad. 34
Fl~8tne •• ,

But most commonly he reter. to them as

seoondne.8, and T.hIrdne8s, tor these terms carry

with them no other oonnotations. 35

Thes. eategories, which

tON the basi. of his phIlosoph,., must now be explained sepa ...

-

31 CP,

5.42.

32 Letter

or

by Per17 in.l'!l! Tbo~t

428-429.

lune'8, 1903, to Wl1111.1'fl Jame., quoted
~ Charaeter !!! Wlll;i~ Jl81es, II,

.33 Ibid., 429.

-CPt 4.3J 5.121.

34 CP, 1.293.
35

-

,-atel,..
Firatn••• 1s the tirst ot Pa1r-ce t s three tundamental
ontological eategories.

"Categorr the Firat 1s the Idea ot that

_loh is 8uch as it i . regardl ••• ot anything &1 se. ]hat 1s to
..,., 1t ls"a gua11tz ot Feeling","36 It is predominant in the

ideas ot trsannes., 11te, treedom.

The tree 1s that Wh1ch hat

noGhing behind It to dete%"Dlinelts actions.

(And insotar .a

the ide. ot negation ot another enters, the idea ot

81

other

el'lters, and thus the Flrstness i8 spoiled by an admixture ot
secondness.)37 Firstnes8, 1n tact, "i8 so tender that you cannot touch it without spoiling it,,,)8 and the minute you begin
to think about it it loses its element of pure Firstneas.
does Peirce mean by Firstness?

What

flT.Ue color ot magenta, the odor

ot attar, the sound ot a railway whistle, the taste ot quinine,
the quality ot the emotion upon contemplating a tine mathematioal
demonstration, the quality of teeling of love,,39 are all example.
of Fir.tness",

Again Peirce says:

Imagine me to wake and in a slumberous condition to
have a vague, unobJectltled, atlll less unaubJect1tlea,
••n••
redne.l, or ot salt t.at., or of an aChe, or
ot grlef or 307, or ot a prolonged musical note. That

0'

36 .2!!, 5.66.
37 CPt 1.302.
,38 cP, 1.3S8.

39

-

CPt

1.304.

would be, aa n.a~~ a. po •• lble, a purely aonadic
state ot feeling.
Fl~atne88,

quality yet

~.malna

then, 1. a qualityJ but thls notion of

to be investigated.

Quallty must not be

thought ot in It. paychological atatus, but mu.t be

t~an.

tarred to ••• taph,..lcal concept1on, which perceives qualit,.
.. a pure nature, in lt.elt wi thout p.~ts or re.tux-e ... and

without embodiment. 41 Quality is not dependent, in Ita being,
upon mind, nor upon the tact that aome material thing po••• a.e.
it.

Quality mu.t not be confused "ith the .ense experience

wbich makes qual1tles known to us.

It i8 the nominalists who

always maintained that quality does not exist wlthout

sense.

The realists, among them Peirce, have always denied this, and
tought tor the oppaa1 te.

i. the great

.rro~

"That qual 1 ty 1s dependent upon sense

ot the conceptualists.

7hat it ia dependent

upon the .ubJect in which it is realized i8 the gr&at error ot
all the nominalistic Ichools. ,,42

"1hat the quallt,. ot ~ed

depends on anybod7 aotually seeing it,

80

no longer red in the dark, 1s a denial ot

that red things are
COll'.lmOn

sens.... 4.3

"A realist," it 18 true, "tully admit. that a .ense-quallty

-

40 CP, 1.)0).
41 Ibid.

42
43

1.422.
-CP,
Ibid.
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...

t. only a po •• ibllity ot senaation", but 8till Rhe think. a

,o•• ibllity remain. possible when it is not actual_ q44 Quality.
then, -7 be detined a& a "mere abstract potential! t'1, and the

error ot those

[nom1nall.tl~

.ohool. liea in holding that tn.

potential, or pOS8ible, Is nothing but what the actual. mak •• 1 t
to be,,"4~

Thu. quality 1& an ..xte:rnal thIng, independent at

the mind,46 a possibility which .en•• experienoe mayor ma7 not
actualize, but which in &nJ cas. is independent ot such actual-

lze.tlon. 47
Lastly the relation ot Pirstnea. to general1ty should
Perhaps it would aeem that a quality could only be

be noted.

partioular, slnce it 1. a kind ot consciousness which involves
no analysi"

comparison, or any process

~at.oever,

aor conslata

in a proce.s by Whioh one stretch ot consc1ousnea. i . di.tin-

44 ~l?\d.
4S Ibid. Pelrce'a us. ot "po•• ibilit,," or "abstract

potentlall~th.re clo •• ly approachea the leholaetic notion ot
potency_ He points out that the error ot the nominalists 11.s
in maintaining that the whole alone 11 something, and its components, however essential to it, are nothIng. f-hU8 the qualIt7
ot red can be the power the red th1ng has ot causing a senaatlon
of red, even though the object may be here and now in the d.ark.
For the red qualIty to become actua11zed, sensation 1s ne.dedl
but no sensation or senae raoulty 1s requisite tor the possibIlity which is the being ot the quality_

46 CP, 6.)27.

-

47 £!,

1.2$,

426.
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gui8hed tro~ another. 48 Yet qualities oan rep ••• ent the genefal ,

.8 i . 1nstanced here,
Imagine at onoe a toothache, a splitting headache,
a jammed tinger, • oom on the toot, a bUl'n, and
a colic, not ne•• ssarily a. exi.ting at once..1.a••
tha t vague-and at tend not to the par-ts ot the !magination but to the resultant impre.sion. Tcat v111
g1ve an ide. of a general qua11ty ot pain.4~
fne 1dea at quality 1s thus the ide. ot a phenomenon considered

•• a monad, without refer-enoe to ita parts or components or to
anything el •• , and as such it cllnstand tor a general.

'When

Peirce call. quality a monad, he i8 not t171ng to say that

every quali
note.

t,. 1s .b1ple 1n the .en.e ot oontaining only one

This would contradlot the notion Just described wheJte'by

qualitJ' can r-.pr ••en't the general.

Rather, the 1de. ot fluali tr

considered a. a lIonad would corre.pond 80mewhat to an undit...
rerentlated simple apprehen.ion in whioh manJ' not •• are contained
in the one Ide.,$O inaamuch aa

the Idea 1. taken In 1t. total.l~

and not considered .. composed ot diver.e elementa.

Thus qualit»

although fundamentall., elmpl., oan be •• en .e general. when re.
fleeted upon, tor what the qualIty can repre.ent i . general,
and Revery quality 1., in it.elt, general_">l

-

48 CP, 1.306.

49 cP f 1.424.
d'apre •

$0

-see Peter Hoenen,

(1

t!P

"
8.J., La Tneorie
de

.ll. Thoma. qt Aquln, Rome, 1946;-lG.
1 h.l.L7

-

JHi~ent

...
Thia last statement m., lead one to wonder how Peirce
distinguIshed between the generalIty ot T.nIrdnea., which prlmarily contalns the notion ot lav. and the generallty ot Firatnesa exhibited in the idea ot quality.
explained in this manner:

lb. ditterence may be

Enough has been said of 'irstneas

to ahow that it is that which the mind arrives at tirst.
first moment at sensation-or at least this

a8em8

interpretatlon-the tlrst moment ot sensation i
senae ot being

undete~lni,

IS

to

be

Thia
Peirce's

general in the

or capable ot turtber

dete~1natlon.

'!hus what i . tirst apprehended 1s not an individual, but a
general e.aence.

As Pelrce statea,

"Given any possible deter-

mination, there ls a po.aible further determ1nation."S2

!bu.

the categorJ ot Thlrdnesa would still contain the generalIt7

required tor unlvera.11t7. while the generality ot the category

ot Flrstne.8 would be only that ot a nttlon that does not enJoy
the perteotl,. Indivldual nature ot tacta, whlCh belong to the
category ot secondn.ss. as will be ••en immediately.
Secondness now merlts cons1deratlon.

"category the

second 1s the Idea ot that Which i8 such as it i8 aa be1ng
Second to some Firat, regardle.s ot anything el... • ••

'!bat

.

i8 to say, it 1s Reaction as an element ot the Phenomenon • .,53

It ia predominant in the Ideas ot causation and ot atatlcal

52

I~ld.

S3 OP, 5.66.
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torce.

...

For caus. and ettect are two, and stat1cal torces &1-

_a1' occur in paIrs.

seoondnesl la also preda.lnant In the

ide. ot reallty, tor the real 1. that whioh Inslst. upon
ing 1 ts wa"1 to reoognl tlon .s

80me thlng 0

torc~

thep than the mlnd f

8

creatlon. 53•
Secondnes. 18 the next simpl.st el ..ent thateames
betore the mlnd, the taot ot struggle.

StandIng on the outslde

ot • door that ls sllghtly ajar, you put your band on the knob
to open it.

You experience an un.een, .1lent re.lstance.

This

is the second.

Secondn... 1. tound even in the reellng ot a

.ingle quality.

For to concentrate steadl1y on one slngle

feeling that never changes auppo.es a knack of mental manipulation whlch exolude. all other 1ncomlng data.

But this re.i8-

tance oould not be had wlthout struggle or forcetul action.
Thua Seoondne.s i . tound 1n all
involve T.hiJ"dne •• , tor

.t~Blle

.Q'Ul'

reaotlons, yet doe. not

1. 8Impl,. a mutual aotion be.

tween two things l'ega1"dle.s of a1l7 80rt ot third or lIutdlum,
and In particular regardle.s ot any law ot actIon. S4

Sla OP, 1.12S. Not!ee that the ide. of reallty first
Comes up in conneotion with S.condn.... ThIs is not the reality
ot _hiloaoph,. baaed on a theol'T ot univer.als 1fhlch are tound.d in things, but rather reali.m a. oppo.ed to idealism. 1hat
ls, in Firstn•• s the quality is Just "given," wl thout .aring
whether it i8 outside the mind or not. In Seoondne •• real o~
je.ta are a •• erted ~lch toroe th....lv•• On eonsoiouan••• tram
outside. Thi. say. nothing as yet about whether these real objects are merely di.parate individual., or Whether they have
something in common.
~h

t!'P.

1.

"!to

't!o)!t
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...

It Plrstneas 1. qualIty, a aomewhat vague and potential thing, Seoondne •• i. taot, 80mething pertectl,. individual.
It happens here and now.;; The tacta in wnich Seeondn••• 1.
verifled must exclude all reteNnee to the general, and with
·It the permanent ox- eternal.

Fox- "generalit,. is eIther ot that

negative lort whlch belongs to' the .erel,. potential,

a.

auoh,

and this 18 peculiar to the oategory ot quallt,.. or It Is ot
that poaitlve kind which belongs to conditional nece •• it,., and
this ls peculiar to the category or law. ";6 (Thirdne.s)
leulv•• tor the categol')' or fact the followings

This

the contingent,

or the accidentall,. actual, and toree without law or reason,

..brute

toroe.

(For tact., ina.much as the,. reala' the will, are

proverbiall,. Called brutal.)
Seoondne.I, then, while excluding the general, ,.et
in a vel')' true .en.e inolude. the real, indeed almost constltut •• 1t.
inaiateno1_

"For the .ingular object is real. and reality 1.

That i. 1itlat we mean b,. trealIt,._ t

It i. the

b:ru te irrational insi. tenc,. that torce. us to acmowledge the

reallty of what we experlence. that givel UI our conviction ot

56 .2l. 1.421. In the negatiT. generality there can
perhapi be •• en a parallel to prime matter, which i , univeraal
negativel,. inaSMUch as it i8 in potency to all torm., wh.reas
the positIve generallt,. would be sim1lar to a uniTersal properly SO-Called.

32
any

singular~"57 Brute oppos1tion requ1res that everything in

the field ot actuality should be individual,

-

"Hio et nune 1"

the phra.e perpetuall" 1n the mouth ot Duns Sootus, who first
,lucidated individual exiatence. n58
The

1de. ot •• cond, tinally 1s easier to comprehend

than that ot tirst.
fOU

Fir.tne •• ¥aa found to be so tender that

could not touch 1t without apolling it, but Seoondne.8 "is

eminently hard and tangible • • • • With what tlrstne ••
'The acarfed bark puts trom her native bay}'

with what .econdness

With overweathered ribs and ragged salls.·

~~~th she

return,

Firstnes8 i8 independent ot Seoondnes8, but Secondnes8 is dependent upon Firstness inasmuch as it consiats In opposition of
a .econd quality to the t1rst quality,

But this will suttice

tor Secondness, tor 1blrdn.s. yet remains to be explained.
"category the Third Is the Idea ot that which i. auch
aa it is aa being a Third, or Med1um, between a Seoond and its
First.

That Is to say, it is Representation aa an element ot

the Phenomenon ... 60

Some predOminant ideaa ot ThirdMsa whioh

S7 CP, 6.340. Attention 1s called to note 53a abov.,
where it was sEOwn that the rea11t7 ot Seoondne.s 1. that opposed
to idealism, and not necessarily a s7atem ot universals.

-

S8 CP, 1.458.
59 ep, 1.358.

-

60 CP, 5.66.
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...

...,.. important in philosoph,. anel leience are senerality, 1ntlnlt,-,
continuity, mean1ng, growth and intelligence.

"A fork in a

stOat! 18 a thIrd, it suppa ••• three waYBJ a straight road, con-

,idered merely .s a connectlon between two plaoe. 1s ••dond,
bUt 80 tar &It

It implie. pa.aing through intermedIate places

it 1s third • .,'l
~lrdness

1. the medium or eonnect1ngbond between

the absolute f1rst and 1e.t.

It "1a nothing but the

cha~acter

of an object Which embodies Betweenn••• or Mediation in ita
,1mple.t and moat rud~.ntary for.m.,,62

The character ot Tnird-

ness i . "mediatIon, wnereb,. a first and aecond are brought into
relatIon."') Thirdness, for in.tance, i8 ~ean~, whioh stands
tor the object and 81v•• 1'1.41 to the ide., 1ts ;nter,eretant.
Again it 1. the "proce •• intervening between" causal act

and the effect. ,,64 1hul it oan be •••n 018ar11 that Thirdne ••
1. a medium, a link, a oormeotlng bond.

But thl. does not leem

to give it the character ot law or generalIty that Pelrce
claimed tor it.

Whence do theae come'

The general content ot Th1rdn.ss will become somewhat

clearer It notice 18 taken of the fact that the phaneron

..
61
62

6,3
6h.

Ui'JiV:::RS ITY

6.32.
-el. 1.)28.
CPt

pe~-

...
• its us to make reliable toreoaats ot the tuture.
ot our waking lit e

"Five minutes

hardl)" pa8s wi thou t our making 80me

W~ll

kind ot predlctlonJ and in the maJorlt7 ot oase8 these prediotions are fult 111 ed In the even t ... 65 Suoh pe8\llarl ty In the
toretelling ot tuture events would be utterly unintelligible

were tbe phane:ron a thing whlch· vas merel,- partlcular.
oannot be 1 ts statua.

That

It must oontain somethlng whlch 11nks

it to lilat 18 to happen, and to what haa happened, whlch aome.
thing can on!,- be an element ot generall t7, tor the very process

of prediotion i8 ot a general nature, reterring, in the maJor1t1
of ca••• , not to a un1quel)" apeoltic outcome, but to a general
kind ot

~utoom.e.

When a cook, tor instance, tollow8 the tnstruo-

tions in her recipe-book tor making an apple pie, ahe oan pre-

-

-

dict that an apple pie vill t-e8ult, but she cannot predict the
.pecitic apple pie which will be produoed. 66 She de.ires a
certain k1nd ot object.

She moreov.roteels confident that

the reCipe wiUJrOduce the d••ired result, that 18, she t.els
that her prediction haa a tendency to be tultilled. 67 Yet thi8

"is to 8ay that the tuture events are in a _.aure reall)" gov-

-

65 cP, 1.26.
66

-

CP, 1 • .34l.

67 s •• Goudg., 'lhO;w0t.2!.£. •

.a.

Peirce, 91-92.

lS
.med b'1 a £aw. ,,68 Generallt'1 and

law are the heart of Third-

nesa, and Peirce .ehementl,. stressed thls pOint:
o! being which consists, mind

nrr

"1hla mode

word it ,.ou pleue, the mode

o! being which conslst.
in the tact that future tacta of Secondo
nes a will take on a determinate general character, I call a
',lt1irdne88. ,.69

And againt

Thlrdnes8 "is that Which 18 what it

1. by virtue of imparting a quality to reactions in the tuture." 70

The va,. that words are used demonstrat.. bow Thirdness aa law intervene. in the phaneron 0,1' meaning.

Every

general term 1mplies an inexhaustible series ot conditional
prediotions, In allot Whioh it will be verltied.

Take &nJ

predicate:
I sa,. ot a stone that it 1s hard. That meana that so
long a8 the .tone remains ha~eve17 e.sa)" to scratch
it .by the moderate pressure ot a knlte willsurel,.
tall. To call the stone hard i8 to predict that no
matter how otten 70U, t1!7 me .%peraent, it will tail
every ttme. ~at innumerable .eries ot condItional
predictions ia Inv~lv.d in the meaning ot this lowly
adjective. Whateve~ may haXl been done will nct be.
gin to exhauat ita meaning. (J.

!he word

expre.ses a law that will hold true tor an

~ he~e

indefinite ttme.

In 11ke manner, the vaat majorit)" of words are

-Ibid.

68 CP, 1.26.
69

-

-

10 CP, 1.343.
."

-

1'1)

1

",'t!'

.aturated with the regularlty ot fhirdn.al.
The rea.on tor this 1., aa was mentloned above, the

tr1ad1c function ot a

~bol

of meanlng.

Unless the symbol,

It. object, and the interpretant are pre.ent, the symbol haa
no meaning.

When thes. three are present. however, the symbol

i ' meaningtul.

'!hus an even c],.earer explanation Is had tor

p.irceta synonyms tor Thlrdne8., Representation or Mediation. 72
The pOint to be noticed here 1n peirc.'. system is
not

80

much the tact that he haa a general law, but rather the

principle behind that law.

For the a.holaatics, a th1ng is

hard not because 1t will re.ist scratching 1n the tuture, but
because 1t has .. definIte quiddlt,y whereby 1t 1. hard here and
now, without anT reterence to the tuture.

Thus the ••• ence

a. a nature (ErincipiUlJl 0R.ration!.) work. 1n a deflnlte manner
becaus. 1t already depends upon the e •• ence as auch (s.uod iuid

-

eat) ot the object.

Pe1rce .eems to mis. thIs point, and his

meanIng ot the universal. ia not tounded on the e •••nOe ot the

or predIction, law, operatlcn,
.s.enoe or the univer.al 1n a

thing, but il related to the id •••

and ettect, thul plaolng the
relation to another event.

It leems that Peirce, instead of

aiming at finding out what a thIng really la, and at derining

ita true nature, rather aims at deacribing how. thing behaves

1n various circUM.tance., and e.pecially, whether there are any

37
,.gularltle; 1n its behavior. 7)

The soholastlol never aplit

the dual notion ot •• senoe .. qulddl t7 and u

n. ture. wh.r....

p8irc. seems to have retained onl7 the notion ot essence ••
nature, and to have rejected the Ide. ot qulddlty aa IOmething

distinct tram the ettects Vblch the thing produoe ••
Be this •• it ma7. the representative and general
character ot Thlrdnass giv.. to the category a teature which
peirce alludes to frequentl,. in the 0loll •• !e.!

paper~.

Thirdn•••

• arks ott hi. philosophy .a a realism .et o.er against the nomi ....
naliam Which 18 pampant 10 moder.n cirol...

But the que.tlon

might be ra1s.d whether phenomenQloQ can b. the baai. tor a
reallam.

Doe. the tpiad on whioh representation and generality

are b....d tall under the obs.rvational method proper to ph_no-

••nol0ta', or doe. it inolude an element not given in sbaple
observation?

'eiroe would .a,. that fbirdne.s 18 reached b7

observation, and hi. reasons are the...

Although the general.

1s not direetl,. perceived in the partioular ("an extraordinaril,.
orude oplnionft74 ), tor "the ,ea. pal is not oapable of tull
actuallz .. tion 1n the world

or

actlon and reaction but is ot the

73 Se. thls passage, tor instance: "The predloate,
hardness, ls not invented by men, .s the word la, but 18 real17
and iru!,. in the hard things and ls on. 1n the. all. a. a
d.scr1,tion or hablt, dlsp;osltlon, or behavior. CP, r.i1n.
TtlasE tille.not Iii ttle orlgInal.)-

74

-

CP, 2.26.
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nature of what 1s thOught. w7$ atill it i . part of th. phaneron,
be detected by phenomenological observation.

tnd 10 can

phenomenology and T.hirdness in

pa~tlcular

ba.i. tor a realistic philosophy_

philosophy that

Pei~ce

Thua

can aerve as the

And it 1s $uch a

claims to have constructed.

~ealistlc

The final

ta.k of this chapter will be, therefore, to examine Peirce"
realism.

First

80me

11m! ts 11111 be placed to hi. rea11sm by

,howing what it i8 not, and then a prelim1nli1Ll7 formulation of
the doetrt.. vill be worked out.
l:be distinction between r8&li_

.a opposed to ideal1_

and realism •• opposed to nomina11sm has already been 1ndicat.d.
Although this thesi. is primarily ooncerned with realism in
the .econd sense as opposed to nominalism, a ahort vindication
of Peirce'. reali .. a. opposed to idealism Ihould be undertaken just to ahow that Peirce 1s vo:rking with real things.
Texts in .nioh Pel:rce maintains the reality of things
independent ot the workings ot the mind are numerous, and could

-

be multiplied almost ad infinitum.
,
as typical,

The following are •• leeted

"What, then. 1. a 5ualitzt Betore answer-ing this,

it will be well to say what It i8 not.

It i. not an,-thing

1rIhich 1s dependent, in ita being, .pon m.ind, wbether 1n the

tom ot ••nse or in that of thought. ,,76

W1hat ia

real which

39
!la. such ant such characters, whether anybod,. think. it to hay.
tb0,8 characterl or

not."77 ftThat which an,. true proposition

aa.erts i.!!!i, in the .enae ot being as 1t is regardless ot
What you or I may th1nk about 1t. n78

"For the singular object
That Is cat we mean by

l' real. and reality 18 inaistenc,..

trealitr.'

It i. the brute irrational inSistency that torces

to acknowledge the reality

of what ve experience,

U8

that giv•• ua

our conTietion ot an,. .ingular. n79
In addition to this explicIt

mental objects exist, one may ask
nitely rejected idealia. verbatim.

contention that

whe~.r

extra-

P.,lree eTer detI-

Th. question would be well

put, and perhapa a lIttle difficult to anawer.

paaaage.

IUch

a. the tollowing throw at firat a dubious 11gb t on P.iroean
realism, but hi • •xPlanation will .how the d1st1notion he $Ada
to avoid idealism:

This 1deal tirst i8 the partIcular thing-tn-itselt.
It doea not exist .a auoh. ~t ia, there 1s no thing
which 1. 1n.1ts.lr-Yn~ .en.e ot not being relati.e

!~~:o:~~:.!b~~ !;!~.t=!c~h:e,.:~!:~!~~8ao

Except tor the final

aaving adversative claus., this atatement

See al80

-

18 CP, 5.432.
79

Cf.t

the

$ ••

-

oP, 5.311, 405, 408, 565.

alao Sf, 5.401. 6, 349. )93,

-

453.

6 • .340. S.e also oP, 2.3371 6.)27. Fras.r'.

454...13"80 .2!, 5' • .311.
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'" to ideal1...
i' very clos.

That 1el1"'Oe desired a l'ealiam,

though, aeem. to be apparent t.oa the emphaSis he u ••d later
in the same parag:raph.

And what do we mean by the l'eal' It i8 a oonception
whioh we must tlrat have had when we diacoyered that
there was an unreal, an illu.ion; that 18. when we
tirst corrected o~selve.. Now the distInction tOr
whiQh alone thIs tact log.t:call.7 oell.", vaa between
an ena relative to prIvate inward determinations, to
the-nigatlona belonging to idl08,ncra.1, and an en.
auch aa would stand in the long pun. '!he peel, m'n,
Is that which sooner or later, tntormation and reasonIng would tinal1,. Haul t ln, and which
tope independent ot the .aga1'ies ot me and :rou.

1. there-

'eiree el.ewhere 8mpl0'18 a more trontal. at tack on
idea11sm:

BUt what evidence 1s there that we can immed1ate17 know on!,. what 18 'pr •• ent~ to the m1nd'
The 1deali8ts g.n.~lly tpeat this aa .elt-evident)
but, as 011£tord jestingl,. &a7., tIt i8 evident' 1s
a phra8S vhlch only means 'we do not know how to
prove. , 2
He then continuesl

Obvlou81y, then, the tirst move toward beating ideali _ at its own game 1s to l"emarlt that
apprehend
our O'Wtl Idea. onl,. .a tloving in time, and since
nel ther the tutuN nor the past, ho....v.r near
may be, i . 2re.ent. tbere i ••a much diftioulty in
conceivlng our perceptlon ot what passes wi thin ua
.a In conoeivlng external. pepception. • • • Once
spant immedIate knowledge 1n t1me, and vhat 'become_
ot the Idealiat th.orr that we tmmedlatel,. know
the presentt For the present can contain no time. ~

w.

th.,.

0ne%

-

81 Ibid.

-

82 Cl, 1.38.

8) Ib14.

...

%D

discussing Kant t 8 Cx-ltl~

..oome. explicit!

.-,mselve..

.!! !!!.!

Pm:e Reason, PelH. again

"But we ha.e direet _!Rarienee

.2!.

thinS.

!!!

Nothing can b. more compl.tely tal.e than that we

..an experlence

.

only our own ld.aa."

84 ot

Berk.ley he sayal

-'!'he thought thinking and the !mIaediate thought-object are the

"'1!1sam. thing regarded trom dirterent points or view.

There ....

tore; Berkele.,. was, ao tar, .ntirely in the x-ight, al though he
blundex-ed when from that manit •• t truth he int.rred his ideal-

l.m. ,,8S
It might be in place to ask

J....

~.ther,

despite hi. re ....

j.ction ot idealism, Peiroe held any type of phenomenalism 81milar to that of william

Phenomenal idealiam .a taught by

Jam••• tate. that the objects ot knowledge are not things, nor
the real. appearances ot things, but their appearance• •a they
are viewed within the mind.

In other wox-dB, the only rea11 ty

i8 .en.ationa a8 we experience them.

Jame.' syatem 1"e1i88 on

this px-1nclple at .vePy turn, as ia evidenced by this .hort,
but characteriatic, selectlon:

the reverse ot this.

"Now mJ contention i8 exactly

EXperienee, I believe, haa no such inner

dupliclty. and the s.paration ot 1 t into consciousness and content cOlne., not bT val" of aubtractlon, but b7 way ot add1tion. tt86

-

84 .9l., 6,95.
85 CP, 6.339,
86 William. Jamea, Easals

-

•

!!

Radical Empiric1sm, New

...
to put the tact baldly, Jame. preaohe. that sensation is me:rel'1
an navarene.s Gt" withGut being an "awarenes. ot a dietinct
reality," a me:re subje.tIve atate whICh doea not poalt an ex,.rnal :real! t,. other than the very sensation.
~e

tact that peirce denied any sort ot Platonic en-

tlt1 or substance behInd the appearances ot thlngs86a may seem
$0

neces.itate hI. adoption ot phenomenali ••, toll owing the a..e

pattern as Jam...

Not so, however .. tor Peiree did not make the

.ame identltication ot subjeot and object that James did, and

henee tor Peiroe the oorN_pond.noe theory 01 tputh still had

aeaning.87

1bIa Is con-oborated by' what has at ready been 8ald

about the oategory ot Firstn••• , whioh haa been shown to be •
quality which !!tIs not 8l7thing which 1. dependent, in its being,
upon mind, whether in the form ot sen.e or in that ot thOUght_ .. e
Again " . .t la ,teal Whioh has such and such oharactera, whether
anybody thinks it to have tho•• oharacters or not ... e8 In thes.

66. In not. 89 It is Shown how pelpce f s denial ot
aub.tance doe. not nece.sarily lead htm to a denial or real

thing ••

87 S.e Jam•• vue! Smith, ttprapati •• Real1am, and
Positlvism in the United stat•• ,· Mind, LXI. April, 19$2, 8.peelally 191, 193, 19$, 198, where tiSiiiuthor show. that Peiroe
11m! ted the pragmatIcs mu1m to the que.tlon ot meaninth and
41d not 1. t 1 t lnter.re:r-e w1 th the theo!7 ot tath, Whereaa
Jame. Jconstantly muddled theory or meaning and theory ot truth,"

87a .2l. 1.422.
88 .£l.. $'.430.
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~d many other plaoea Pe1ree not onl,. rejects absolute 1deali_,
but alsO demands that real objects exiat aeparate troll the

thought of them, thus repudlating pheno••nal ideal1sm a180.

Having now eatablilhed that Pe1rce held that there
were existent singulars which do not depend upon the mind for

their beIng,89 the next task la. to see what kind ot reali t7 ia
oharacter1st1c of these s1ngulars.

Are the,. merely grouped ta.

,ether under eonvel'Jient cl.ssifica tiona 1n a nominal 1st theo17?

or

are they unIversals 1n themselves,

Or Is there 80me other poasibi11ty'

p~taking

ot a Platoni.,

Theae questiona deaerve

oU'etul study.

Peirce'a realism, taking realism now In the aeoond
••nse

.a opposed to nomlnallsm,

theory.

truly rejects the nominaliatic

Thi. i8 elear from the numerous refutat10ns of nom!-

nali8l11 given at the beginnlng

ot this ohapter.

Theztef'ore

•

89 !}'hi" thelia doe. not go into the que"tioD of just
What the •• real things are. Pe1l"'Oe' 8 doctrine on aubatanee
1. so_what ot a matter ot dispute, and 1 t would seem that he
denled 1ts realIty, except Inamuch •• sub. tan•• ls a kind ot
regular! ty or habit. (.2,l, 1.411) Cel"talnl,., however, he elaimed
. that at lea.t accldenta were real, not ppeol.el,. _Iua accIdent.
(tor a aubject would then be 1"equl1"ed) I but sua
ppearins
thlngs" 01" "glven." It ma,. be that Pe1X"Ce.a averalon to admitt1ng the exi.tene. ot subatance va. due to a reluotanee to
embrace the Lockean idea or unknown aubatrate. B7 aaying that
only qualities are real, Peirce mI.,. have been merel,. 1"eiteratl~
one ot the ba.ie tenets of re.ll_-that there 1e nothlng In
l-eallty whlch 18 an unknown ~~an... loh. Be that
lt _y,
he doe. admlt real thing., a~iP.to1". the questlon can be
legitimately put whether the •• real object. are linked together
in
kind ot generalitr.

.a

an,.
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doctrine ot realism fall. 80meWhere in that line ot

th twha\l

"man, hor •• , and other na.n.. of natural

s, correspond

wi

all men, or all horses, reall,.

in common, independent ot our thOught. n90
Nor does Peiree'. reallsm entall a Platonlc world of
I\1bal.tent ide.s or universal f'OrD18.

,e1roe asserts his stand

on this matter tirmly.
~~.ry

realist must, &8 auch, admit that a general 1.
a term and theretore a sign. It, in addltion, he
holds that it ls an absolute exemplar, this Platonia
paB.e. qulte beyond the queation ot nominall_ and
reali.., and indeed the doctrine ot Platoni~lideas
haa been held by the extremest nominalist ••

This passage was wr1tten towards the end of' Peiroe'l literary
work.

At the very beginning of' his career he had also adhered

to this .ame opinion, tor in 1871 he had aaid:

"The notion

that the controvers,. between reali_ and nominali8lll had

8>. '1-

thlng to do with Platonio ideaa ls .. mere product of' the imagi-

nation, .nich the s11ghtest exam1nation of the books would
turrice to d18ProV •• ft92
Against thl. opinion, Felbleman93 contends that Pe1rce
did hold a doctrine ot Platonio ide.s, and he bolsters his oon-

90 Fra.er'. fterkel!l,

454.

92

-Fra••S.470.
r" Berkelel, 458.

93

,ntroductio~!2

<)1

CP,

Peirce's Philos0Pel, 179.

tention

..

by .e.e~al texts.

Although the arguments are convincing

at first eight, a clo •• r stud,. of the passage. in question stl11

I.ems to

allo~

the contrary interpretation.

For instance,

"irce 18 quoted a. saying that the ideas in the existing world
are oft-shoot. from, or a:rbltra17 determinations of, a world

ot ideaa, a Platonic world. 94 But what does Peiree underatand
by the •• yet undeter:mined ide.s which exist in

world?

the Platonic

In another text Peirce explains what he means by "an

ide. that i . in no mind lt and whioh had not ,et attained full

being.

Th••• undetermined Ideas tb6s have Ita mare potential

being, a being

!!!

tut~,"

which keep. them from being "utter

nothingness.,,9S The Platonic world, or so it seema to the
present writer, turne out to be analogous to the 1homistic
absolute order In which all e •••nee. exlst ab.olyed trom the

conditions ot .1ngularlty and univerSality.96

-

94 cP, 6.192.
Pelrce 1s not m.~l,. reduclng the ••
undetermined tou to the stat. ot ph.lve potency. tor he aa,._
that th1. potential be1ns the,- have "would ttot be the utter
nothlngn••• which would befall matter (or spIrit) it it were

95 CPt 1.218.

to be depr1ved ot the governance ot Ide... • • • For matter

WOuld thus not only not aotually exlat, but 1 t would hot have
even a potentIal existence, since potentlality is an affair ot
ideaa. It would be Just downright Iothlng. fl (Ibid.) The:re.rore
the interpretation gIven In the text ot the thee!' ...ma lIcit.

96 See, tor instan•• , St. ?boa_ Aquina., De Ente
fat Dlent!., In.2.. ThomuAsulnatla 22uacula 9D'.nla neiiio~.ra

J!~§j: ·~;l:::~·!n~:;!!:rrie~·id~a:a:~:tdl!:~'b~S~lV!!::lSl-
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...
Another talling common to theories ot reallsm whloh
1s eliminated by Peirce Is that the generals exiat In the same
~ay

that indIvIdual tacta do.

He i8 not one at thoae re-+lat.

'Who belIeve, tor instanoe, that the ,..,.. of gravitation exists
"1n nature" precisel,. in the a.ame way as particular talling
bodies exl.t. 97 Peirce'. distinction between secondnesa and

Tbirdnes8 prevents thia hlPostaa1s ot generals, tor, as haa
been shown, existence 1s. ll:m.1ted to 1ndividual tacts by Secondness, and cannot properl,. be predicated ot generals.

A

"al.lat

need not mainta1n the existanc. ot generals} he need only uphold
their, re&llty.98

That is, Peirce concelves ot existence as a

special mod.e of reality, Just a8 rellll ty In Its turn ia a special
mode ot being.

Just as there can be being with no complete real-

ity (on, tor instance, Prot.gor.. ' assumption that man ia

t~.

measure ot all thIngs), so there can be reality wIthout existence, tor existence Is an absolutely determinate torm. ot real-

ItJ. 99 Peirce admit' that generals are real, ~t he doea not
in themselv.s (thus avoiding Platonism), and ,.et the,. are not
determ1ned to a particular being. They could theretore be tbe
nature accord1ng to its absolute considerat1on, nei~er part1cular nor univereal.

6.)49,
.
-CP, ,.cr.
97

CP, l.27n.

98 Peirce quite otten thus distinguiSh •• existence

and real1 ty, the latter ot which has the wider extenlton.

For
instance, In OP,
he ea,.e: "I call your attent10n to the
tact that reaIIt, and existence are t...o ditfer~nt things."
See &110

.,

to accord to them the same absolutely determinate exi8t•
• nce which belongs to 1ndividuals as .uch.
:rhus doe 8 Peirce avoid .eveX'al ot the more common

.:r!'ors made

by proponents

ot realism in the past.

The next

,tep must be to explain what he himaelf held on the un1ver8al-

1~, or the generality as he preterred to call It,lOO ot real
things.

The problem to

bo aolved now 1s to ascertain

~18.

character ot the "samething"

ba.e

in

~Ich

the pre-

all mambers ot a ola ••

common, and how it 18 related to the conoX'ete indivIdual

on the one hand and to the abstX'act un1versal concept on the
other.
lines.

Peirce'. doctr1ne ••em. to evolve along the tollow1ng
Only 8ingular things exist apart from thought. 10l But

the nature, or the intelligible content,

"i_

the very _.-

--

nature ~lch in the mind is unIversal and in re 18 singular."lOI

Or, to • • up.

The truth 18, thererore, that that real nature whlch
exists 1n re, apart trom all action ot the intelleot,
though 1ii 1l'selt, apUt' tl"ODl it. relationa, 1t be
.Ingular, yet is actually universal as it exist. in

100 "lb.is word [un1versa11 waa used in the MIddle Ages
Where we ahould now use the word General. • • •'When the Schola ••
tic. talk ot universal., they merely mean general term•• "

-

(CP, 2.)67.)

101

£!, 6.49$.

102

Fras.r t , Berkelel, 4$9.

Fra.e~ts ~erkele%,

4$9.

relation to the mind. 10)
• tail" objeotion to the U8e ot this last passage would be to say

that peiroe ls only summarizing scotus' position here, and not
.tating hi. own opinion.

That m1ght be true it the same thought

vere not to reour again in Pelrce t s wrIt1ngs, but the continual
outcropping ot this idea torcea. one to ascribe it to Peirce
himself.

In an imag1nary dIalogue between a pragmatlcist and.

hi. opponent, Peirce adopts as his opinIon the doctrine of the
great doctors of the past, who did not belie.e that general. I,
.xisted, "but regarded generals aa mod•• ot determination ot
individuals, and such mod•• were recognised .. being ot the

na~e ot thought."104 The question i • • • ttled in the same
tenor, but more conclusively, in this paaaaget
'lheJ.'te is no man Of whom. all turther determtnation can
be denied, yet there 18 a man, abstraction being made
ot all further determinatlon. There is a real d1rterence between man irrespectlve of what the other determinations may be, an! man with this 01'" that partioular
seri.s of determinations, although undoubtedly thia
lO~
dittel"'ence 18 only relative to the mind and not.!!! .!.!..
!he "man

l~sp.ctlv.

of what the other deteminatlons IU7 be"

1s the nature aa 1t exists in

~elation

to the mind, while the

"man wi th this or that particular ••rl•• of determinations"
1. the exlstlng .ingular object.

-

459-460.
104 CP, 5.50].
10)

Ibid.,

-
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pe~rce

hasteos to an.wer an objection that suoh a

"i'w ot the universal. d•• troy. ita reality because it makes it

The belief that the ream must

4.pend on a relation to thought.
b' independent of

1. tal.e.
~ual

reflective aotlvlty, or be a thing In itselt,

The not10n ot a thing in itself, e'xaggc-ated "in the

philosopher faablon,"

l.a~s

to a self-contradiction, tor

it it 1s an obJeot ot thought, it cannot be at the same, time
wholly outside the pale. of the mind,106 tor a man cannot have
any conoeption of an incognizable reali ty.107

Indeed, it 1.

quite plain that fta realist is simply one who knows no molte
pecondite It.alit, than tbat whlch i. P8preaented in a true
pepreaentation.

Slnoe, theretore, tne word 'man' 1. true or

,omething, that which 'man t means i8 1"8.1.,,108
nalist who runs into diffioultl••

her~tor

It ls the nomi.

he maintains that

there i8 an unknowable something which allows you to predioate

man of all ita interiors, while the realist .tapIr state. that
-man" i8 a universal naturte 1b ioh can theretoH be applied to
the interiors because of an identical 1ntellig1ble content.
But this Simple analys18,

80

close to the doctrine

tbliliar to soholaa tics, w1ll not sutfice tor an adequate treatment ot Peirc.an realism.

-

106 CP, $.$25.
107 CP, $.312.
108

•

While it i . true that the tundamen-

50
tal. ot his "'system have now been traced, thet>e 1et remain
,everal quite interesting elaborations on tn1s ba.ic tneorr
~lch

deserve to be noticed.

IE the treatment given to the ••

additional pOints i8 not conclusive or .at1atying in the pre-

,ent oontext,

an attempt vill be made later in the thesis to

Jbow their rull import in relation to other tactors to be

introduced in aubsequent chaptera.
The first tact to be noted, and One ot capltal 1mportance in Peirc.' ••yst.m ot universals, is the striking
41tterence 1n the tundamentam in re Which 1s the ba.ia ot the
p

--.....-

tor.mal universal tor Peirce, and tor Scotus and the other eohol•• tles.

Tbat intrinsic "aomething" 1n each being WhiCh allows

a univeraal to be predlcated ot 1t 18, tor Aristotle and the
.chol.atica, the substantial tor.m or nature ot the being by
Wh1ch the being ls and by whloh it i8 thls being.1OSa 'elrce
doea not get his generalltytrom this source} rather the ele.
ment in a being Which aerves as the baaia tot" generall ty ls ..
hablt ot actlon, not yet rull,

d.te~ined,

but tendlng towarda

tulllJr and tuller determination a. the habit becomes mer e lUlIveraa!.

-

(f.bat is, a8 ltapplie. to more and more

sl~.tion••

)

lOS. St. Thom... , tor instance, says: wEt 1deo relln.
qUOd ratio generia vel apecie1 oonvenlat .ssentia. secundum quod 81gnltlcatur per modua totlua, ut nomine hominia vel
an1malla, prout impllcit. et indlstincte contlnet totum quod in
1ndlvlduo est." De EDt. et Essentia, Chap. III, ed. Perrier,
I, 35.
--~ltur
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tbe roots of thl. tneorJ lie in pelrce's adaptation ot evolutiona%,}" ide.s trom Darwinlsm in his principle of chance, in
h1s theory ot pragmaticism whlch hold s that meaning ls all the

possible result. ot an ide.,and in his teachlng, borrowed 110re
trom Lamarck than tram Darwin, on m.ind .s • babl t-taklng raoul-

$1.109 To explain all ot the.~ tully would take a good-s1zed
book, but in. short space their influence on generality can ,at

least be pOinted out summarily_
Hepe 18 how D&I'winism militate. against the Aristotelian theory ot tlxed llO torml, ~r "universals infrangibly
.stablished for onee and all in the beginning 01" time, unadapt1ve and unalterable torever."lll

Since evolution presumes

that new species are oontinuall,. ooming into existence, the

members ot theae new species must be related to ona another
by a universal not hitherto

had in nature.

But since the very

109 See CP, 6.15-17, tor .. summ.ary ot the varloua
theories ot evolution. Also 6.)00 tor Lamarck.
110

It ma,. be that the connotation of "tixed" torm

led Peirce to look elsewhere tor the toundation tor h1s universal in things. It "'lxed" 18 interpreted .a "atatio,"

then there would be no room tor development or change In torm..
But it a "fixed" tom can at the aame time be a natura, or
Ir1ncialua operationi., as it is tor Aristotle and Ene schol-

astIcs, tEen ~he very te1801087 ot tne operatIon ota being
would pOint to 1ts development.
111 Fe1bleman,

Introduetlon~

?eircats Ph1losophll

~de

..

of being ot Aristotle's torms is

~!!,

a transition

t~o.m

one to another become. lmpossible almost by def1nitlon. Sino.,
tnerefore, Darwinian evolut10nl12 ,eemed to make the dootrine
ot forma as tixed, unohangeable entities untenable, pelrce

looked afield tor a theoPy that would allow his teaching on the
reallty ot general. to tit the proorustean bed ot no atable l1 )
torma wlthout undergolng such change. a. to render unlversal.
unreal.

He found such a theory in the principle ot chanoe

and the teaohing that hab1 t, or law, 18

one ot the predoalnant

teatures of nature, Whether mind or matter.

Pelroe, in a paper entitled "T.be DOotrine of Nec••• it}'
lX&mined,_l14 attacked rigid ne.e.sltarian1-. and it. consequent
of flxed torms on several count..

They are principally thes.,

l)1be seneral prevalenoe ot gr-owth,

2) the

variety ot the un!-

pelx-e., it ie plain, was much impre.sed by the
work of Darwin.. In 1900 he sald that it was h1s "inestimable
pr1v11ege to have telt .a a young man the warmth of the steadl1y burning enthuaiaam ot the scientific generat10n ot Darwin."
(Sm1thsonian Institution R.~gl't •• Wa.shington, 1900, 694.) But
hi never futly .dopEea '~. heory.a 811eh, although elem.-nta
of 1 t oontinued to 1nfluence b1Jl 1n othel' lin•• ot thought.
112

113 Once again 1t ia pointed out that Pei:roe .eema
to have identitied the notions of • fixed, or .table, torm and
ot a atatio torm. Not wanting the latter, he alao rejeoted
th. tormer, and thereto:re had to seek another toundation tor
hi. generals, Scholaatl~ hovever, 8"y that the torm is tixe4,
and theretore have an intl'1nsic baaia tor univeraalit.T, vhI1e
the tom as a nature •• rv •• alao
the :tr inoipl. ot opel'ation
and devel.paeni ot the being.

a.
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••rse, whlch~ .prings tram chance, and 1. manit.atly inexplicable,

and. 3) the existence ot law, which requires to be explain.d,

and

lIke everything el •• whioh 1s to be explained, muat be explalne4

b1 8om.thing else, that la, by non"law or real chance.

Peirce,

tone.iving matter 8ameWhat .. the anclents, held that the Whole
world has evolved to 1ts present state through lawa which have
developed trom the ellaot1cma.. that exi.ted 1n the beginning,
and 1s progre.sing to even further determination and pertee.

tion.

But

~at

Is it that explaine wh;r this .peele. should

arls. rather than that?

It 1,. chance.

W1 thout chance thing.

would be determined to one, and nothing new would ever come
into existence.

Yet chance, on the other hand, 1. a180 the

root ot 18•• 115 For once an event has occurred by chance,

III

habit ot ·.ome sort 18 .et up in the matter whioh makes tne

.ame event more likel,. to happen agaln than ita opposite.

Yet

.nat ls law it not a rule, or habIt, aa;ring that thi. given

.vent will happen rather than that in the.e oircUlI1Stanoe.?

So

law, which was •••n to be one manite.tation ot Thlrdne •• ,
'.uses the particular existents charaettrlaed by Fir.tn••• and
Secondne •• to contorm to an indef1nite future.

not existing in the realm of

t.ct~

Thus, aJ. though

Thirdn•• s a. law may be .ald

to govern that realm, s1nce future event. of Firstne.s and SecGndnes8 will conform to 1t.

-

But even law it.elt 1. not tull,.

•

...

4.t.mined (thus again there is no tixed ".torm" to aerve .s

th- balls tor generality), tor It law were rIgidly carried out
tttl,l babi ts would at once become 10 fixed as to give room tor
110 turther

formation ot habIts. ,.116
,

This last phrase can be better elucidated by conddering a twotold meaningot h1lbit.

HabIt can be a form, or

principle ot operation, as a habit of alamgiving tlows from a

torm in the IndIvidual.

Or again habit may be considered as

law, the wayan operation takes place under given circumstances.

In Peirce's Collected Pm,ers it is very dIfficult to find definite references to habit as

fo~,

acoidental or substantial,

,.peciall,. in the sixth volume whioh treats of the matter ex-

tensi vel,..

Therefore peIrce looked upon habit almost exclu-

lively as law, which give. the key to the root weakness in his

theory ot universals.

Peirce neVer goes on to ask what there

-

18 in the thing which i8 the principle ot the law.

ae has the

operation, but the prinoiple 01" the operatIon i8 laeking.
haa been

alrea~

This

noted above in connection wIth the representa.

ti Te tunc ttem ot '!'hir4n••••
But ha. Pelrce, In aestroying all fl.ed torms and
hablta, cut himselt ott trom a rea11stlc explanation ot unIversals?

Peiro. thought not.

Fort at though he had no form

1ntrInaio to the thing to .erve as a baai. for univevaali ty.

-

116

•

• did retaln~th. principle pointed out above in the .ection
c Thirdneas, namely, that general. are 1 ... 8, tw Thirdne •• ia

,. meana ot predioting 'What w11l generally happen.

Prom this

,r em1 • e Peirce 4educed-or it will be deduced tor him here~.

following s711 0 g 1.. ,
Generals are lawl,
Ci law. are relations (not tC»n'l') •

• : general. are rel.a tiona (not torma).

r,r.ne truth of the minor proposition ia maniteat trom 'What haa
just been sald on the preceding page about habIt aa e~ulval.nt
to law, and not to form.

B7 law, in other worda, Peiroe does

Inot mean the form lx-om whloh the hahi t flowS, but the
~avlng a reaction on other eventa.

]a w

aa

And onCe he had settled

upon a relation rather than a tom as the tundamentWll in N

P1. . . . . . . . . . . . .

(or should It be Int~t

was obvious.

.!:!!,) tor universal it7, hi. next move

B7 introduoing a logio ot relatIve. he believed

that he could retain his claim to the tItle ot realist.

"The

great ditterenoe," he explain., "between the logio ot relative.
and ordinary logiC i . that the t~er regards the torm of rela-

tion in, all its generalit,. and in its difterent possible .pee1 ••
16111. the latter 1s tied down to the matter or the single speolal

relation ot similarity_"117

~us ordinary logiC haa much to

do with genera and $peel•• , or sets ot objects "compriSing all

56
tbat stand

to

one another in a speoial relation ot similaritYI~

whereas the logic of relative. goes further, and reters to
.ystems whIch are ,ets ot obJeots "comprising aD.ljhat stand to

one another in a group ot connected relatlons. ttl19

reasoning tor the

~o

The mod. ot

logics varies, tor

Induotion according to ord1narr logiC rl.e. tram the
contemplation of a sample ot a 01as8 to that ot the
¥.hole 01a.8, but accordlng to the 10glc ot relatIve.
it riaes from the contemplatIon ot a fragment of a
system to the envlsagement ot the complete ayatem. l20
What is the loglcal consequenoe ot this new logio?
The old ide .. ot univ.r.al as

!!

un~ "Et~

suod p .. edloari pot.at

plurlbu. oan be retained, but 1n a new settIng.

No longer

18 1 tone torm. which oan be toUl.ld in man,. 1nd! vidual., tor the

torm Is not tixed, but ever_changlng.121

1be .ame law, or

habIt, however, can apply to the same set ot objects, tor, even

though they are changing (or at leaat becoming more and more

determined with the passage of time), atl11 the .ame relation
between them oontinue. to hold true.

Abbot' 8 word, 1s found also in Peirce"

1h18 re1atlonlsm, to use
theo17 ot pragmatici ••

Where the being ot the concept and truth doe. not eon.i.t in a

-

118 Ibid.
119

120

lbid.
Ibid.

121 It hard17 need be repeated that pe1rce haa not
yet found 8 pr1nc!ple tor the operat ion of the hab! t aa long .a
he deni •• a form in the balna.

..
,tatic unit"

S7
but in the1r relation to other eventa.

For

instance, the
that Is, the rational purport ot a word
or other exp:Nt •• lon, 11e. exclu.lvely in its coneelvable bearing upon the conduct or lIte, 80 that,.lnce
obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have all1' direct bearing upon conduct, if one
can define accuratel,. all the conceivable experimental
phenomena Which the affirmation or denial ot a concept
could imply, one '1111 have therein a oomplete definition ot thel~~ncept, and there !! abeolu tell nothlns
more 1n it •
.......-...-.
s1a1lar17t
cone~tlon,

--

The opinion Which is fated to be ultimately agreed
to by all who Investigate is what ve mean by the
truth, and t~!~object represented in this opinion
is the real. ~
Truth, then, i8 what everyone Will agree upon, tor, aa Pe1rce
el.e~ere

remarks, it there are no dl •• enters fro.. an opinion,

then that $pinion can be accepted aa

~.

(e.pec1ally it tne

trith i8 arrived at through experimentation, tor then there
wl1l have been other truitle.s experiments which did not 4ive
the l"eaul ta cOntained in the one truth tlnal11 al-riYed at, and
henee were discarded.)
One ma7 vonder how the mind could be satisfied with
accepting truth or universality a8 mere11 a relation between

things, and not wanting to pIn it down to a single determined

-

122 CP,
123

-

CPt

S.412.
5.407.

,8
detirition

.wer

o~e ••• nc.

Which It oan

und.~stand.

PeI~oe

would an-

thil obJeotion by saying that it i8 the .ery nature or

the mind to be always looking tor the turther determinations

ot things, and he would demonstrate his oontention by an application ot the principle ot continuity.
ti~st

Ju. t u

the event which

took plaoe by chance in •• tter becomes a habit and thua

oan be predioted by mean. ot a law,

80

the mind also becom.s

aooustomed to .eeing things happen in a certain order, and an
aS8ooiation ot ideal 18 built up whiGh permitl the mind to
formulate a general law. 124
'lhus m1nd and mat tar are governed by the same habi t,
and as hab1 ts and laws in matte%" move to%"W&rd to slteater and

lreater determination, mind moves alons with them 2ar1 2aaau.
"'lhe e ••enca ot fleason is auch that ita being never oan have
been oomp18 tel., pertected.
oipiency. ot growth.

It always muat be in a .tata ot tn-

It 1a 11k. the oharaoter ot a man ¥hich

consiats in the Idea8 that he wl11 conceive and in tha etforts

124 Palroe attempt. to tree himselt trom the charge ot
bowever, by atating that mInd i . not governed by
mechanical law, but rather that the "one orIginal law [1sJ the
recognued law ot mind, the law ot aaaooiation, ot whlch the law.
of matter are regarded .a mere special .eaults." (CP, 6.277)
materiali~,

01' agalnt

"Hatter would be nothing but mind tha t

nad

such In-

dUl'ated habits as to cause It to act with a p".u11arlr high
~.gree ot mechanioal regularit1. or routine." (Ibid.)
It is alaoworthwhile to mention here ~th1rd prin~ipl. in Peirce along with chanca and habit-taking which ex~laln8 the existence ot law in the universe, namel,., love, or
.aso~tion.
Tbrough this association, as mentioned in the text,
~e mind i. able to torm a law correlating similar event ••

59
that he w1l1'" make, and which only develops aa the occasions
.ctuallyariae. n125
That, in briet, 1a a picture ot Peiree'a realism.
does have real objects, thua rejecting idealism.

He

And he bolda

• common nature wh1ch 1. 8ing'llar in the individual things, but
universal. in 1ta relation to the mind.

Yet this eommon nature

1. not a tixed Ar1atot_llan torm (not something real11 intrinsio
to the being,
~orm),

tor Pe1rce a.w an intrinaio torm a8 only a .tatic

but something ever developing along Darwin1an l1ne ••

aut the new log1c ot relative •• an atill tind universality in
~ompa:r1ng

a fragment

the whole system.
~ecause

ot a .,..tem, ohallging though it be, to

The mind, moreover, i. satistied with this

it is a habit-taking faculty,

and ~.

iNhich is prelented to it moat frequentl,._

aa true that

With thi. sketoh of

Peirce'. realism completed, it i. time f1na111 to examine some

pf 1ts sourcea.
125

-

CP ,

1.615.

...
ORAl!ER III

SOURCES OF PEIRCE'S REALISM
Although the reader may b. anxious to s .. where
peirce'. theory ot realls. wUl. lead him, he must restraln hi.
tnter•• t while an outllne 1s aketched deplcting the baOkground
in Which Peirce vorked.

To understand and evaluate hls system

fully; acoount must be taken ot h1s knowledge ot Duns Scotus
and Franci. Ellingwood Abbot, and the influenoe they had on
him.

With a clear understanding ot th ••• source., It will be

easler to detect and .eparate various lactors 1n relrce'. own
lySte.m.

~.

reali .. ot Scotu. will be treated in the first part

of thi. chapter, followed 0'7 a scrutiny of Abbot"

theo!7.

1ben

in the next chapter P.irce-a use of the •••ouroe. will be inv•••

tlgated.
In his dIM tl'lne of universals, !:Juna sootua large17
tollowed the theo17 of his time, whioh St. Thomas too had ac.apted.

Universals exiat 1n three wIJ's

a. 1de.a in the mind ot God, 2)

!!

l~

l?etore thing.,

thing., .a their ••••no.J

and 3) ~ tel' things, •• abatract Clonoepta in the .1nds
•

-

1

Beranard Ge7er, Friedrloh ueberve,s
60

ot men. l

qrundrl.~ ~

61
...
setting _ide the ti!'st type ot unive,..al. which i. usuallY'
oalled un1.e!'a.l.,

in

"aulando, the pr1ma1"1 aim of the •• pege.

will be to establiSh the relationship between the universal
nature as 1 t exlsts In things and that aame na tUN as the mind
knOWs 1t.

The tirst pOint to be. taken up Is the relation ot the
tormalitle. in the thIngs to the concepts ot them in the mind.
A too rapid appraisal of Seotua' doctrine here leada manJ to

imPute to him an exaggerated real1_.

It mal be that thl.

charge 1s true, for Scotus certainly leave. htmaelt more open
to tne aocu•• tion than most ot the other aehol.atic., however,

hI. dootrine will be given here with no judgment as to whether 1i
verge. too tar toward the reitieatien ot univeraals or not.
What, then, are the formaliti •• ?

~.l

are not, firat

of all, the note. in a hhing Which oOPreapond to the concepta

had in the mind.

1hia position would ineluctably lead into an

exaggerated realism.

Th.Y' are, ratner, distinct realiti •• in

a thing, to eaoh ot which correspond. a dIstinct concept.

The ••

entitie., or realities, do not exist apart or .eparately from
One another, but there does exist in reality a certain distino-

tion between them to which the distinction between their ooncepta

tn the mind answera.

Thus, acoording to the tormal distinctlon,

telcb10hte del' Phll0SO~1.~ II. Die 'atrlatlaohe und Sohol.. .. I8clie phI'lOiOpSre, 12 e4., Baser, X9'St. Jlz. -

...

a being will

lPOS• • • • •a

mAnJ tormal diatinctions .a the intel-

leot oan tor.m dlstinot ooncepta about that be1ng.
not go

tNnt

sootus doe.

the intellect to the thing, but in the thing there

---are objects whioh must be grasped bJ such divers. oonoepts.!

-

T.bus the tor.mal distinction 1s a real distInction.
that Is, in rea11ty the tormal distinotion precede. all acts ot
the intellect.

It 1. not, however, a distinotion between thing.

which exist apart trOlll qne _other, but simply atatea that on.

formality is not another formality, or that there 18 no to!'!!!A
ldentl!l; pl'e.ent.

In taot, Sectus would rather speak of a

formal non-ldentltJ than ot a to~al distinction.)

Thus, be.

cause 1n a being the tormal. note of r-atlonali tr doe. not Inelud.
the tormal note of an1malli7 or corpol'eit."

there 1. in thia

being a tonual l1on.ldentlt'J, or dlstlnction, preoi.e17 because
of the lack of formal identity.

TheNtore Sootus can hold that

hi. universals are not produots of the intellect applled to tbe

2 "Non ,uod ratl0 acclplatur pro dttterentla tormata
ab Intellectu. sed ut patio acoipltur pro qulddltate ~.1 aeoundum quod ,ulddltaa e.t oblectum lntellectua. u o~ua Oxonien.e,
I, d. 2, q. 7, n. 4), Vi••• ed., paris, 1891-18,=, VIII, 60li.
The author ot thi. the.i. haa been fortunate In having
at hi. disposal a r!2ortatio ot a CO~8. on Tbe Human Soul 1n
John nuns Sootua gIven. Sf 'rotesaor Etienne Gllson at the Pontifioal. InstItute of Medl.eval StudI•• 1n ToZ"onto, Oct(),ber-

December, 1950.
!he

re!!l'tat~o

Lecture. ~.e to Eleven were ••pecially helpful.
was taken b7 Michael M. Montague, S.J.

3 uMeliu8 eat utI iata negattv., hoob_on eat torma11ter- idem, quam hoo .st 810 et a1c dIatlnctum. Ibid, n. 44.
603b.

6)

...

outslde world, but are found in things by the I11nd. 4
~tit

yet pemalna to be •••n in what pel. tlon the

unlver.al stand, to the mind and to thlng..

For Scotus "unI-

,.ersal" means two things. . subjectIvely It 18 the notIon prodUced by- the m1nd, the second Intentlon whlch exists only in

the intellect. objectively it stands to%' the absolute essence

or the thing conaidered in ita universal aspects.

or

This qulddlty-

1tsolt 1a neither univer.al nor singular, but indifferent,

and o~atltutee the direot objeot

or

the Intellect. S scotus 1.

at great paina to ateer the middle course between extreme reall_

4 "univerealla non sunt fictione. Intellectua, tunc
enim nunquam 1n quid pl"aedloaren'bur de re extra, nee ad i8tlnltlone. pert1nerent, nee Metaphysic. dltre1'ret a Loglca, imo
omnia 8clentl. easet Logio., quia de universall." fobeoram.ta
subt1l1a81ma, IV, Vlv•• ed., V,
authenaicit,. ot the'l'heore. .ta haa been the matter
of much dispute. Wadding and the b!fier 8 • .1'17 Scoti.ts considered it authentlc. Lonur' and other modems have held the
opposing vlew. 1he latest trend, however. seems to be toward
regarding it .s possibly auth.ntl~, and this i . the vi.w of
BaudPJ'. Balle, BOehner, and finall,. Gllson, who argues t:rom the
internal evidenoe ot the seneral agreement in doctrine of the
Theoremat. with the rest of sootus- genuine ~lt1ng.. At an7
rat.; It use ls ~ad. ot it onl7 to state in clearer terms what
other p.s.age. hint at, Scotu.' doctrine w111 not be mutilated
by the
ot the work, even though 1 t should prove to be .put-l-

1".

m.

ou••

I

U..

5 "Universal. aoclpltur allquando p~ intentlone
••cunda, quae Mqultur operatloneD! pr1mam intellectua, qua Intel11g1tur quldditu absolute. • • • Allq,uando autem un1versale
acclpltur pro re 8ubjecta intention! .ecundae, id .at pro quiddltate rel absolute, quae quantum est de •• , nee eat un!verlalla,
nee singular1., •• d de •• eat Inditter.n., et tale eat obJectwa
Intellectua d1rectum. w 9ua.at~one8 '!!irLl~ro~ Art.totelia !!

Anima, XVII, n. 14, Vive.

;a.,

If!.

~

a-b.

64and nOminaliam, and thus to sateguard the realit,' of the indi.1dual without jeopardizing the objective valldit,y of the un!-

.ersal.

!heretore he devotes long pa.aage. to a minute ex-

planatlon of the relation between the universal in the thing
and the univeraal in the mind.

R. wiah•• to com.bine logical

oonceptualism w1th metaph7s1cal real1sm w1thout a hypostatlzatlon
ot the conoept.
'lb. actuall,. ex18ting thing ia the 1ndivldual.

Dif-

rerent indIvidual. ot the aame speo1es ahare a common nature,

but that nature 18 not of It.elt common, tor It does not ex1st
1n the indlvidual sub patione o!J!!!P!?:i!.

The oomm.un1t,' 1. path.r

• mode which belongs to the nature only 1n80rar .a ! t 1. oonoeived .s common Or universal by the mind. 6

Logically, however,

1t is prior to both th••• condItions and, regaPded in the light

or th1. prior1t7, 1t is the easenoe . . ~

,u;~.!.!1.

the metaphy.ical -what," Whioh i8 ier .!! the object ot the inteUect. 7
••

6 "Diol poteat, quod ratio oommunis, vel ~pposltl,
non attrlbuitur 81, ut ,salatlt, ••d ut oonolp1tur ap~ lnt.Ilectuna• • • • Ie;ltuJ' oomaune .ecundum quod habet ratlone. ooa.unl., eat natura, prout concepta .ub ratione 4lcibl118 4. plu1'1bu•• " suaeatlonea 1n LlbJ"oa Per1hermenlaa. I, q. 1. n. 4,
Vlve. e4., I, 55t"'5~2:I

.

7 -Quallter aute. poteat hoc lntell1g1, poteet ali.
Clual1ter vidept per dictUlll Av14ennae S Metee. ubl vult quod
minlt.S .•
tant\uJl lhutn1taa, neo ex •• una,' nee elure., nec
_ versitla nec eart1e.".r.. In£.l.I!,'i; i'On ear.x •• una;un!tate. • .-.0 mo(l6 quo illquid ••t universale taotum. .b !ntell_ow, non ut obj_ctua Intellectua, ne. eat particularla ••
•• , lloet enlm nunquam a1t real1ter sine allquQ 1stol'Wll, non
tamen eat de •• aliquod IatoPUa, ••d
prIus naturalltep am-

,t

,.t

6$

...
AS an absolute quIddIty, then, it exist.

IndItt.~ent17

1n the

objective world of thIngs, neIther singular nop universal.

aut

this 1. not the tull picturel

the common nature even in

its relation to the mind 18 originally indifterent to representing the ....n_a....tu..;.;;;;o..ra.... ja '!,!J universali

t,. 1s .. tupther logical

de terminat ion. to!' a1 though the quidd.l t:r is known as un! vereal,

univettsali ty does not enter into the metaph,.alcal concept of
the natUH

1.8

auch, but is .. logical addition. 8 !heretore the

universal exist. a. actually univeraa.ll.ed only in the mind,
insofar.a it ia predicable ot many individuals.' Despite thIs,
however, one must not imagine that 1 ts un! ty i8 purely subjec-

-- a.

t!ve, tor in virtue of ita existenee 1n re

a nature it poa-

ae ... s an objective unit,- of 1ts ovn, qulte apart trom the sub-

nibu. tstta. Et secundum iatam prlorltatem natur.alem est sao~
qU~! !!!. et per a. objeotum intellectus. tt ORus o~•• , II,
.,
q. , •• 7, Viv•••d., XII, 48a-b.

8 "Non .olus autem ip.a natura eat d. •• inditt.rena
ad ease in Int.l1.ctu, et In partlculari, ac per hoe ad .,••
universale at singular., •• d et ipsa hahan•••• e in intellectu,
non habet pr1Dto ex: se univers.litatem; llcet-rnIm Ipsa intel11gatur sub ~lver.alltate, ut sub modo tnt.llisend! ipl",
tamen unlversallt •• non est pers' conceptus ejus prbd, quia non
cone.ptua fifetaphy.lci .ed Logiei. Logiou••nim eonaiderat aecund.. intentione. applioataa prlm1 •• " Ibid., 46b.
9 "Dleo quod universal. in aotu non est n1sl in intellectu, quia non .at aotu. univareal., ni8l ,i t unum in multi.
et de mult18, ita quod de multi. eat &ptitudo px-oxima unlve:ra_alia in aotu, quia non poteat haber! in aetu univ.rsal., qUOt:
Ipsum .at diclbl1e de all0 ••• n1ai per Intellectum."
Parisienala. II, d. 2, q. ,. n. 12.

fteEo:rta~~
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•

.dtiv. unity ot the concept, a unity which i8 neither numerical
or merely conceptual, but a specific unity, and which, al though
10
•• 8 than a numerical unitJ, is yet none the le8S r.al.
Wh7 is the unity of the common nature a numerical

anit,. whioh 1s less than real'
~ing

that can have real unity t. the Singular existing mattWiJl

)bjeet.
versal

Precisely because the onl,.

The common nature, Which i. really I)nly a stack ot unito~alities,

1s indifferent to singularit7 or universality,

lnd ean be tied down to a singular thing onl,. by haeccel ~.s.
~atf
~cotus

though, 18 the nature ot this haeeeetty, and why doe.
mak0 it an lntegral part of his system?

First of aU,

Scotus needs hascoeity to sateguard the unity ot being.
",.y

On.

have wondered what has happened to the uni ty ot being

tOJ!

scotus, slnoe there are -variOUS different formaliti •• present
in the same being.

To

st. Thomas such a situation is

able, tor a being can hav. only one substantial torm.

is the

aetu~

8ssendi which make. a thing exist

In scotus the caS8 1. dlfterent.

unthink-

-

E• •

~1!21ioiter.

-

the •••• Whieh belongs to

10 rtDloo ad ~ ••• tione. cone8dando. • • quod .at
unita. ext~a an1mam minor quam numeral!., ut $I).cU1ea • • • •
Cn. 12] Tam.en lata uni taa reall. medla inter I1l.\11l4tralem et rat!oni~! non eat d1rterentia un1versalltati"
quia hoc est actu
dlc1a11e de multi., .ed .olum .st indlfferent!a, secundum ~am
non repugn.at sibl ease hoc at hoe .1mul, taman non poteat ••cundum. i.tam reale. un1tat._inopem 8S8e a1mul hoc et hoo,. nisl
1n conceptu in intellectu, ,uOd non est ex parte sul, quia equlnitaa est tantu. equlnlta..
tbld., n. 11-12.
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each ••••nce i8 the !!!! ••••n~i .. J being exiat, onl7 through
the e88e

~xsi.t.nti~,

tch the whole is

which OODles to 1t through the torm by

!!s.!!l!, that

18, a singular being completel,.

defined in the order of quiddity.

Haeccelty 1s this ultimate

actualIty ot the form.

The nature ot haeceeity can be outlined brierly,

it

at be a positive entitYJ 1t must not be 1n the common nature;
and it must be able to enter into com.position with the common

natuH.

It oannot be nega"t1ve, tor then it would be nothing,

and the tnt_tor would not difter troll the

eoDlllOtJ.

natttre.

It

must be .o_thing outside the common nature, tor the oommon
natutte ot i tselt can be found in many things, and that by which

an individual 1. an indIvidual must be perfectly Ind1vidual for
each single being.

1'h1. posl tive entlt7,

""17.

must be able

to enter into 00.,08it10n td th the common nature 1n order to
fON

a being Whioh 18 an !!!!!!!

2.~ s~ ..

One must not get a oontu.ed not10n ot ha.coeity, hov-

eTer, and imagine that it 1. the laat or the torm. which const! tu te a being.

Thl. perilap. would be the loglcal outg:rowth

of scotua' system or .ssentlallst

meta~hl.ic8

Where the entire

emphaal. 18 placed on the 11ne ot quiddlty, but it is not wba t
ScotU8

wishe..

---

Haeeeett,. 1. that by which are. e.t haec.

The

!.!! ls all'ead7 tull,. oon.tltuted 1n the line ot CluIddlt, through
ita torma ot corporel ty, an1mality, rationality, etc., and need.
onlZ the l •• t "tom" or h.e.celt,. to determine it to a particular
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1,ndlvldual, "'just .a 1'1ltlonallt'1 determlnes the genus to a
.pec.!...

But

the parallel 1a not pertect.

'!'he oommon nature of

ratIonal an1mal, along with all the other torma it has, 1. already tullr constituted 1n the line ot essence.

It doe. not

ne.d another torm to give 1t indIvidual exlstene •• 11 H••ee.1tl,
theretore, 18 not. torm, but the ultima realltaa formae, or the
ultima --.......actualitaa
to~e.t! Dr. Minge. 1 ) explalns It in th1 •
.......................
.................._, ...........................
11 What the ....nc. n.eds to be lndividuated, ot
course, i8 not another determinatIon in the line ot 8ssence,
but a l1m.1tatlon ot the e.senoe 80 that it oan be multiplied.
1hi8 to:p st. Thomas .is mater1't !Uantitate slf!;ta. as he point.
out In ;!b. BOat. de rr!ii., q. • a. 2 and ar, Parma ed.,
XVlt;-l .31~. Ad'aI'tIon ot another torm c.,.never gat sootua
out ot the oommon nature or out of quasl~univ.rselit7. 800tu.
thel'eto:re sa18 that thel'a 1s something 1n the quiddit,', wh1ch
mak•• the th1ng singular, but ,.et i . nora qu1ddlt,._
12 In all fin1te beings, the pl'opel'tr ot the posl,lve
anti ty 'Wh1ch ind.i vidual i... the c:a.u.lddity 1s not ~o add anothel'
quiddity to the first, but the ettect ot the positive individuating entlt,y i. to posit the whole qulddltatlve entity (genus
and d1fterence) in a being ot another sort than quiddity'. ThIs
new oz-der 1s the o:rder ot the singular. "Ista realltas indlvidui
e8t similia realltatl specifioae, quod eat quasi actus determinan. 11lam r8811t&t8• •pecle1 quasl po.sibll•• et potentlal••,

•• d quoad hoe eliss1mlll., juiiilsta nunluam aumltur a forma addita, ••d ~a.Ol •• ab ult1m& t-e!t'ate forma.. ~uoaC! "IlIui1 .tl_
iit
Ite, quli It!a reatlE.a specIfloa 00118tl tul t 8~o81~, oujua eat pars, 1n ea •• qulddltativo, qula 1psa est entltaa
quae dam qulddltatlvaJ 1.8ta autem entltaa 1ndlvldul est Pl"1.'It10 dl ... '
versa ~ omn1 entltate qulddltat1va, quod Pl"obatUl" ex hoo, quIa
intelligendo quamcumqae entltat . . quiddltatlvam, loquendo de
quldd1tatlva entltate l1mitata, non habetu~ in qulddltat~ intellecta, unde Ipsa ait haec, ergo l11a entltaa, tuae de se est
haec, est alla ent!.s a quidditate vel ab enti tat e quiddltatlva.
non pote.t ergo conatituere tatum cujus eat para, in es.e quiddltatlvo, .e4 in 8S8e alterlu8 %*Atlonia. ft ~2u, Oxon., II, d.
q. 6,
12, Vive. ed., XII, 135&. (Ital os no~ In origlnal.l
1.3 par then ius Minges, O.P.Mtt Del" ansebllche enesalve Re";llamua ~ Dune Scotu~, 1908, q,o-4?7
·

rna

n.

'f
1
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'!he ul t1ma real!
ta. enti. 1s not the la.at intoming
•
prineiple, but tne numerical determination ot the tor.m and

matter of the composite as
makes this analoBY"

~ torm and thl~ matter. Gl1sonl4

In a poor WilY, haecoei t'yc 18 oomparable to

a bud in the springtime which is juat ready to burst, the haecoei

t,.

18 an energy that wants te burst uP. It 1s in the torm and

yet is not the torm, but a metaphYllcal energ'1 which make. the

indivIdual to be the individual whioh it la.
passing b1 the diffioulti •• which thla Scotl.tic

doctrine engendepa-thi8 the.i. 18 not att ••ptlng to detend

BCotu., but to give a b~.t r.~ of h1s doctrine on realia~
80me

of the implioatlons whiCh the emphasia on hae ••• lv., give.

riae to mal" be considered.

In th ... will be found 80m.ot tho••

distinoti.e t.ature. of 8eotls. which the other scholastlca
lacked, and which drew Peirce'8 attention to Duns more than to

ant othel' figure ot the

past, with the p08s1 ble exception of

Kant, whom, however, ,Peiree followed not .a a d1sc1ple, but .s
ar. .tl0.

On. thing that haeoeeit,. resul ted :In was a decided

empba8t. on the singular. 81n•• the indtvidual. 18 constltuted
e~

such through a posttlve entlt7. and not by a more paalive

prinCiple of individuation aa the Signata _ttel' ot St. Thomaa.

"Hi. more aOiantl!!c inslatenoe on the eoncrete nature of real.
ity," according to Hurls, "gives to his thinking a distinctlvel,.
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1I1odern tUVOUl'.

It is not enough for him that the particular

tIhould be somehow Ob.CUNl,. .en.ed, i t i . the pr1taa17 :reality
and must theretox-e be intelligible Eer

u- ,,15

POI- 'by making the individual. to be such through «

Pfutltive entlt,', Scotu. once again makes the singular an ob.
Ject of intuitive cognition.

Witbout going into the que.tlon

ot whetheI- scotns held that there was intultive knowledge ot
the singular a8 auch .a well as of the exis "tanoe

of the .in....

gular,16 It can cartainl,. be said that he lald much
on such knowledge than did

st.

rejectlon of the luidditaa

t!! 8enalbl11s

ot the 1ntel1ect.

mON

1h18 can be .. en in hI.

Thomas.

as the natural object

ne rules this out on many groundst

ph181call,. speaking, the quiddl ty

or ..

stNsS

Meta-

material thing cannot

be the propett object ot the intellect, tor the a.lene8 of aol-

ence. 1. metaph,.s1cl and metaphyaics haa tor 1ts object being
qua b.ing.

Oonsequently, 1t the natural. object of the intelleot

were the ••••n•• of a material thlng, the aolence of metaph,.sl ••

would be impo •• lble. 17 FttOm the theologioal viewpoInt the pro-

15 C.R,S. Barris, Duns Sootu., II, Oxt'ord. 1927, 24.
16 Suoh is the thesis of Fr. Seba.tian Dar,O.F.M.,
P

¥$S3

ln hIs Intuitive eO~itlon. St, Bonaventure, N.Y., 1947. Prot.
Gl1son, 50V8ver, t. a6.0%ute1T oonvinced that Sootus never
held this doctrine tor man 1n the pre.ent atate." Reportatic
ot The Human Soul in scotus, Lecture Eleven.
17 "Quldquld p'r s. cogno.cltur a potentia cognitive,
vel elt ejul objectum pl'blum, vel cont1netur sub 1110 objecto,
en. aut.mf· ut e8t comtl1UniUI .enaibill, per .e 1ntelllg1tv ab

...
per object cannot be the quiddity ot a
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mate~ial

thing b.caus.

the soul then could not natuX'&lly ••• God in the Beatitlc
Paychological grounds aJ.so rule this opin10n out, toX'

V1810n.

the Intellect i. paX't ot the substance man, which i. an intel-

ligible univocally ca.parable witn the angelio Intelle.t.
both angels

a~

It

men al'*e Intell.etual lubstances; then the,. muat

both have the 8,ame proper objec t.

'lbe angela cannot have need

ot obtaining knowledge trom the quiddities ot material things;
therefore manta tntell.ct must know the qu14dity in 1t.elf
wi thout knowing 1 t aa eXisting in the s1ngular .18

sootus t pttlnlt

reason tor aa••,.tlng thla tact is that, aa he ae•• 1 t,

ot~ra

betore him have overlooked the tundamental pOint that the quId"",

d1t7

or

It.elf 18 .,ually inditterent to unlverlallty and sln-

gularity.

What one l.e8 flrat 1n the existing thlng i , neither

the universal nor the .ingular. It 1s the natura oqsnunis.

nu.

to the oommon nature, the cognition ot th. universal i8 posslble.
tor It i8 not a property of the qulddit7 as Cluiddit7 that it
exlst In the singular, or be known AI a unlver.al. 19
intellectu no.tro, allas Metaphyslca non e.,et .ag1a sclent1a
transcendenll quam Ph,..loa, ergo non pote.t &liquid ea.e pr1mum
objeotum intellectu8 nostri, quod alt partioularlua ente. quia
tunc ens in •• nullo modo !ntelligeretur a nobia. tt ~ Oxon .. ,
I, d. 3, q. ) ••• " Vive. ed., IX, 6'-90.
---18 "NUl seoundUll. auam ratlon ••, Angelus cum cagnosoat
perreate quiddltate. rei material!s, oportet quod ips" aap10iat
in phantaamate, quod .at lalaum." Opus 2xon., I, d. 3. q~ 6,
n. 28, Vive. ed., IX, 292a.
19 ftLioet ergo quldditaa non ex.iatat nisi in auppoaito
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And '1et Sootu. holds that the singular is known directl,., bet'o1"e the unl"e••al. 19a He oorrectl,. .tate. that st.

Thomas must :re11 on a .eturn at the ;l.ntelleut to the phantasm
to know the singular, to. the matter whlch constitutes tne

Thomistic prinelple 01' indlvlduatlon 1. necessarily oonfined
to the aenae powe:ra and oannot 'enter the intellect.
object. to thl. explanation:

"Haeo ~••20nsl0 m1lla

But Seotus

m- ,,20

For the intellect . .t know either the singular or the universal
fi1".t.

It cannot know the singular first, linee. according to

'lhomlstlc principles, the singular af,not the objeot ot direct
intellectual oognit1on.

!}hen the universal must be known tirst.

"el singular!, pot.at 'baaen lnt.Illg! Ab lntellectu, non intelligendo quod 8xeletat 1n eo, at al0 tal8WB e.t quod a.sumlt,
acl11cet quod nOD poaalt lntellig! qulddltaa, nisi ut exeistena
In singular1 intelllgatup. Non aDim e.t de ratione quIddltatls,
ut qulddltaa .at, quod in slngul.arl exslstat, 11cet non nis1 in
eo exalstat realiter." Ib14., 292a-b.
19a Typical lp.a.agea are the.e. "Duplex .at cognlt!o,
8cil1e8t abstl"'aetiva at intuit!v. . . . . et utnqu. cognition.
poteat cognoael tam natura, ut praeeedit slngularltatem. qua.

singulare, ut hoe." Ibid., III, a. 14. q. ,3, n. 4, Vives ed.,
XIV, ~24a. "Et lie comparando Int.ll.c~ ad imagination. .,
a11quando oognoaoltur universal. pl"luII quam partioulare, et
hoc est verum, d.um 1nt811.otu8 abatl'ahit uni"eraa.le a sens1b111
apppehenso per sensum particularem.. Allquando priuS cognoscitur
particulare: quod quid_ tit, dum abstrahitur ratiO univeraalia
a phantasmate, ••u a re particular!, ut eat In !maginat1Ya.
Comparando autem lntel1ectum ad .ensum perticularem, prior .st
not1t1a singularis, et a ••nau, .t ab intellectu, quam notltla
universalia, De Rerum prIqc12lo, q. 1), •• 3, Vives ed., IV.
522b,
-

292a.

20

o,Eus,

axon.,

I, d. 3•• q. 6, n. 28, VIves ed., IX,
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1 ty are not in the na tUN aa such- they a:re in the na tu:re. bu t

--

not in the nature .a such--it is possible tor man to know the
natures of thlngs without knowing the individuals lntultlvely.22
Nor 1s It absurd to say that man haa the capaclty to intult the
singular, but cannot do so in the present 11te.

He still has

the power; he is unable to exerolse it, just .. a blind ma
still has the power of Sight, but cannot here and nov use it.
There
realism.

I~

br.ad linea 1. the outline ot scottatic

Tbe system pivots around the oentral ide.s ot the

common nature and h •• coeity.

The common natu!"e, which ex-

pressea the "rious qu1ddi tie. ot things, becomes universal when

conceived by the mlnd in relation to interiors, and becomes
Individual when individuated In one singular existing thing

through the perteotion of haecoelty, which is not a torm, but
the last ao wa1i ty ot the torm.

Because individuation toUows

upon something positive, the individual i8 given more emphasla

b7

scotus than by most soholastics, indeed, many ot his tollowePi

have wished to say that we do have real intuitive .-ledge ot
the lingulaI'.

But

even PUl1ng thi. out, there remains a realism

Which i8 suftioiently demarcated trom the reat ot the aoholastl0

22 Scotua recognized this When he atated that the indivIdual goes beyond the e.sence ot the thing: "DettnitiQ exprlmi t quid •• t causae epeoiel 801umJ aed indivlduum ex.pr1mi t
plulquam qul~tatem. et Ideo .Jus non elt detln1tl0 propria."
~.p. Par18., II, d. 2, q._
n. 10, Vives ed., XXIII, 4la.a.
oe8 not say that we oannot know the aingular~ he :merelr 8 tate.
that the knowledge had ot 1t cannot be uaed tor detinlt ons.

a,

...

posltions to be
school.
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characte~i8tic.ll7

the product of • dlstinct

It 18 to thi. fa.et ot soholastic!a that Peirce

attracted early in his lite.

Following an exposition

or

WM

the

realism ot Abbot, the next ohapter will take up the influence
these two men had on Peire. 1n the format ion

or

his realism.

Francis Ell1ngwood Abbot (18)6-190) .a. from all
account. a mistit, a man constantly looking tor a pOSition 1n
lite that suited him and never tinding it.

Moving in a reli-

gious and philosophical baokground, he wandered trom one pulpit to another in hi. search tor a religion which would leave

htm tree acope to exercise his lIberal views.

Hia philosophical

acumen (dootorate from Harvard in 1881) was rir8t displayed in
several artieles tor Tn. North American Review, and his Selen............

•

$1*1

tific Theia!!2'; won European acclaim, even being translated into
Genman.

He tatled 1n several attempts to obtain a ohair or

phIlosophy at Cornell and Harvard, perhaps partiall,. due to
theologioal reasona.

He dId le cture tor Jos1ah 110yoe at sar-

-

vard one year, publi.h1ng h1s lecture. under the title ot The

.2! Asnoetlc1.m

waz

~

~

Philoso2hI (1907), an elaborate technical ay.nth•• is of hI.

(1890).

H1a last work was

~

8111°61.-

thought which neyw.r became popular.

2) Boston, leBS. All quotations in this theaia are
trom the second edition, Boston, 1886.
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TG.

attention 81_en to Abbot in this theal. i. cen-

tered entirely on the Introduotion to hls

Thela.t a

~oientitlc

book whioh turned out to be more significant in the movement ot
American philosophic re.11sm than in the cause ot tree religion.
Ita exoellent exposition ot objective relatlvism 1s important
here not only because 1t vas one of the flrst moves in that
field, but also beeause it vas detinitely the touchstone whioh
atarted Peirce's thoughts In the direction of vindioating the
rea11sm of scienoe.

One author has said that it vas "Abbot. s

mistortune to be twenty years ahead ot his due time,

It

tor "his

keen and subtle 01'1 tique ot idealism, so ottenslve to his Amerlcan contemporaries, would later have proved most aooeptable ... 24
In th1. chapter the maln trends ot the ol'i tlque wl11 be made
elear, and In the next It vl11 be shown that at least one American oontemporary vas not oftended by the reall.tl0 pOSition ot
Abbot's Introduotion.
After brletly stating the purpose ot his book, vhIch
is that "tor a quarter of a centu17 It haa been rrJ'1 growing
oonviction that the solution of all the problems can on11 be
aocomp1iahed b7 the prinolple
ot the ObJectIvItv
ot Relations, .. ~
.
_
ulllil_iiIiiIiIiiiilliilliiiiiiiiilliiiiiiJ
Abbot launChes immediately into a polemic against the Copernlcan

Abbot,"

24 Francls Albert Christle, "Prancis Ellingwood

~lctlonaEl ~

25

Americaq

Blo~ra2hz,

Scientitic Tbeism, ix.
Nt

New York, 1943, I, 12.
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revolution ot Kant which he olalm. 1. nothIng more than the
oulminatlon of the revolution begun b1 the nominalists
betore, starting wIth Roaoelllnua and Oakham.

c.n~lea

Since genera and

,pecie. are oleaaltieationa ot things based on thelr supposed

resemblanoea and difterence., nominalism's denial ot all ObJective validity to genera and speci•• 1. the denial ot all

obj.o~

tlve reallty to the supposed re.emblances and ditterenoe. ot
things themselve., the denial ot all knowledge of the relationa

ot objecta ls the denial ot all knowledge ot the objeota

~elat.dJ

and thi. denial i. tantamount to the aasertlon that thinga-in-

themaelve. are utterly unknown.

Kfm.tt. only contribution

~o

this general schem., of nominalism waa that he expanded the
unknowability ot the thing-in-itself Into a selt-conaistent

phIlosophIcal Sf' tam.

Sub.equent to Kantta masterly develop-

ment ot nominallsm. into a great phIlosophIcal edUice. all
modern philosoph,., b7 taclt acreement, ".e.ts upon the nominal26
1.tlc theory of unlversals.
In the train ot the ROlcelllno-tt-.tlan revolutIon
the natural x-••ult should have been the oontraotion ot human
knowledge to mare selt-consciousness.

Fortunately, however,

there has alway. be.n a "oommon-sen •• " school 1n phllosophy

and 1n the other tields Of lit. whlOb retu ••d to tollow nominallstio princIples out to thelr logical concluslons.

These
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school. have kept alive the realistIc side of that absolute
and insoluble contradiotion between the one teaohing that

cogni tion oontorms to things and the other that things con-

torm to cognltlon. 27
So deep, in tact, iathi. contradIction rooted that
the battle between nomlnalism and realls1l.u:\not over 7et.

But,

Abbot go.. on the sa1, just •• the realism of scholasticism
perlShed before nom1nallsm,

80

wll1 nominalism in Its turn

peri8h btttor. the new realiam of soience, the scientific reallsm
or relationi_ to be explained 1n these page..
ke7 to realism 11e in sclenc.'

And *7 doea the

aecause sclenoe never gave in

to nom.1nallam throughout the centul*les_

Abbot

pointedl,. r ....

marxsl

It woUld be .uperfluous to cite further passases
in order to illustrate the thoroughl1 objective spirit,
method, andr.sulta of modern SCience, aa oontrasted
with those of modern philosophy_ All scientific investigationa are tounded on a theorr dlamet2ioall7
opposed to that of Kant: namel7, that thlngs can be
known, though inc_ple te17 known, as they are in themselves, and that cogn1tion must oonform Itself to
tham, not they to It • • • • Science has achievee all
its marvellous triumphs by practicall7 denying the
fundamental principle laid down by Kant, and b7
practically proceeding upon its exact opposlte, and
1 t i8 a scandal t. philosopby that she haa not yet
legitimated this practical procedure, ovePNhelmingly
justifled .a it is by Its incontrovertlble results.
Tbe tlme has come tor phllosophy to reverse the
Rosceillno-Kantlan revolutlon, and give to science
a theory of knowledge Which anall render the aclentitlc method, not praotically successful (tor that

27 Ibid., 9-11.
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It already Is), but theoretically 1mpregnable. 28

Abbot next ahOWI how Soorates, vltb hi. objective
world, put r ••llsm into the tore tor a mlllenium and a halt,
Influenclng both Plato and Arlatotle.
intolerance with which the

Ch~h,"

However, the "terrible

which had taken it. stand

in phllosophy upon Plato and Artstotle, natamped out all dla-

.ent trom this fixed

.tand~

ot belief, inevitably tended to

exclte a reaction against it, in
1 ty ot the age. ,,29

p~portion

to the mental actlv-

There should be, then, Abbot eont1nue., no

cause to wonder at the tact that the cause ot nominalism came
to be identitied with the cause ot intellectual and religious

fr.edom, and the triumph ot the one with the triumph of the
other.
Porph7~t.

Introduction to the Cate,orie. of Aristotle

i8 now pointed to as the oeca.ion ot the great dispute between
~om1nalls.m

and real1sm, and Abbot proceeds to give .i2 theori ••

!which at various times were introduced to solve the problem.
Hi. anal,.si. is both enlightening in that it presents the vaPl.

pus doctrines in very briet-although not alway. correct-torm,
and helptul in that he
~ol.

~apid11

seta the historical stage of the

era.
Extreme realism (.....uni
.........v
....e_r....8....&_1...1....
a ante!!!!) taught that

28

29

-

Ibid.,

14.

Ibid., 21.

80
unlversal. were substances or things, existing independently ot
and separable troll. pal'tlculars

01"

individuals.

propounded by Plato and Seotus Erlgena.

--

ThIs theol"7 was

-

Moderate realism (un!-

---

vel'salla in re) also taught tinAt universals were substances,
......... .........
but only a. dependent upon and lnseparable trom indivlduals,

In whlch the,. inhered; that is,·each univel'sal inhered In eaoh

ot the partIculars l'anged under it.
the

~eorr

ThIs, Abbot atatea, wu

of Aristotle.
EXtreme nomlnallsm. (universali! 2o.t.!:.!!) taught that

unlversal. had no substantIve

01"

objective exlst.nce at all, but

were merely empty name. or worda (nomina,
voces,
flatus vocla).
...
-...
ibis was the doctrine ot Roaoellinus.
oonceptualism.

(~lveraalia

20st

r~~)

Moderate nominallsm,

01'

taught that universal.

had no substantive existence at all, but yet are more than mel'e
name. signitying nothing) and that they exist reall,., though
only subjectlvely, a. concepts 1n the m.ind, ot which name. are
the vocal symbols.

Ab.lard was probably tne orIginator of this

system, and Ockham its chiet representative.
A1bertus Magnus, St. Thomas, Duns ScotUB and the
scholaatics in genel'al are put 1nto a 01ass by themselvea, which
tUBed aIatbes. views 1nto one and taught that universals exist
in a thl"....told m.anner,

.!!l1!!!!!, .!!! re, and post .!:!!!.30

None ot these vieva aatisfled Abbot.

He therefore

.

proposed • sixth which would 801ve the question ot realism and
His theory ot relationiam, or acient1tic

nominalism decialvely_

realism, (ot which universali.

_i_n_t_er~,

!!! may be adopted aa an

apt tormula) teachea that universala, or genera and apecies, are,
first, objective relations ot resemblance among objectively
existing things, seoondly, subjeotive concepts ot these relations
determined in the mind by the relations themselvesJ and, thirdly,
names representative both ot the relations and the concepta, and
applicable alike to both.

This doctrine, "although empirically

employed with dazzling success in the 1nvestisation ot Nature,
does not appear to have been ever theoretically generalized or
atated. ,,)1
What is the roundation or relationism?

The dootrine

in general rests for its Justification upon the broader principle ot the

objectivi~

propositions on which

ot relations.

~lationism

In particular, the

depends are these.

1)

Rela-

tions are absolutely inseparable trom their terms.

2) The

relations of things are absolutely

the things

them.elves.

)

Insepa~able t~om

The relations ot things must exist where the

things themselves are, Whether objectively in the
Jectively in the mind.

wo~ld

or sub-

4) There is no logical 8.1 ternative be-

tween affirming the objectivity ot relations in and with that ot
things, and denying the objectivity of things in and with that
11

Ibid •• 2";.26.

ot relatlona ....32
The tremendous atep torwa:rd made by this theory over
scholaatic real 18m i8 that it avolda the great error ot the
sehoolmen, the hypo8tatlzation ot universala aa substances,
entitles, or things, relationism teaohe. that genera and apeel ••
ex18t objectlvely, but only a. r.elations, and that things and
:relatloDs oonstitute two great, distinot orders ot objeotive
reali t,., inseparable in existence, yet d.lstinguiahable in
thought.

lbe philosophic value, laatl,., ot this new doctrine oan

hardl,. be overt.t1mat.d.

It aav.a .at is good 1n each ot the

other proposed solutions to the controvera,. over univeraals, and
rejects what 1. bad.

It vindicate. extreme rea11s. tor upholding

the objeotivity of universala, 'but ahows that it waa Wl'ong in
classing the. as independent and .eparable sub.tancea.

It Jus.

tlties moderate realiam tor maintaining the objectivity ot universals, but ohastises it tor making them inherent in individuals
as individuals, rather than in groups ot individuals aa groups,
tor relationa do not inhere in either of the related term. taken
Singly. but inhere in all the terma taken colleotively.

Rela-

tioniam praiae. extreme nominali •• tor 1t. denial ot universals
a. 8ubstances or things and tor its affIrmation ot the exi8tence
of univeraala aa name., although it vas wrong in asserting that
univeraal. did not exiat obJeotively .a relationa and subjectivel,

32 Ibid., 26-27.

8)

...
as concepts. Moderate nominalism, al. though admitting univeraal •
•

subjectively aa concepta, still retained the error ot denying
their objectivity as relation ••
It relationism is the great panacea, how has it been
allowed to remain hidden all these years?

ot

thi~

question must be distinguished.

The presupposition
As a doctrine, rela-

tionism has been obscured by nominalism Which gradually won the
ascendancy among philosophers atter the downfall ot scholastic
realism.

As an untormulated and empirical prinCiple, however,

relationlsm did eXist, and became the actual practice of scientitic observers, experimenters, and inve.tigators of nature,
although they may have been nQminallsts in name.)3

But why

did the philosophers not discover this theory at some pOint in
their speculations through these centuries, espeoially it it ia
so evident a solution to the problem of universals?

Undoubtedly

this vould have been the case, had philoaophl continued to concentrate its attention on the problem ot universals.

But once

she had accepted nominalism, which said that universals do not
exist,she vaa confronted with a new problem.

For the schol-

astics, the source ot knowledge was placed in the universals.
with no universals, how was the origin ot oognition to be explained?

Nominalism turned ita tull powers to the solution ot

this question, and allowed the other problem to slip trom its

33 Ibid •• 29.
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mind.
Even here science had the answer,

While phIlosophers

were dividing into two camps on the origin of knowledge, while
Descartes and the a priori school thought cognition begaa in
the mind, and Locke and the a posteriori taction voted for the
senses, while alath!s useless bickering vas going on among the
philosophers, science boldly adopted the principle ot objective
verification to uphold the origin of knowledge, a prinCiple
depending absolutel,. for Its validit,. upon relationism.

Ever

since then "SCientific men have quietl,. assumed the objecti1ity

ot relations and steadily pursued. the path of disoover,. in total
disregard of the disputes ot metaph1siClans.ft~
Science, therefore, in d.eed rather than in word, is
challenging the very toundation ot nominalistic philosophy.

She

denie. by the erection of a vast and towering editlce ot verified
objective knowledge that genera and species are devold of objectlve reality, or that general terms are without their objective
correlates.

Her very existence is the abundant vindication of

relationism as the atable and solid foundation ot real knowledge

ot an objective universe.

In tact, aa the ca.e now stand.,

philosophy has two great schools, equall,. founded
on a reasoned subjectivism which denie. the fO.Sibiliil at knOWiSf' 1n any degree, an o6leclIVe ,. exI.ten cosmos as t really ia; While science rests immovably on the tact that ahe actuallz knows such a eoa-

34. Ibid., 33.

8S

...

,110a, and prov•• ~ v ...1tl"atlon the realit,. of that
knovledaa whiCh jEl!oaoph,f tou!l,. and emphatioall,.

denle •• ;)!>

What mu.t philosoph,. 40 to keep up wlth thechanglng
She must .hake ott the blighting lntluenoe of .chol •••

t1me.'

tlciam, for .he has never modernised heraelt suftIo1ently to
get rid ot noainalla., one of the legitimate ottsprlng ot the
Middle Age..
t •• t ot

To 40 thia ahe will have to ".It mod.atly at the

.ci~oe"'6 and 1mbue her.elt thorougn11 wltn the 'Plr!t

ot the .clentltic method.
the

on1,. then vill ahe be able to .olve

problema she hal be.n .tPUggllng with .0 long.

Arlstotle,

acoording to Abbot. had seen the 'Glution a long t1me ago, it
interpreted oorreotl,..
Translating the 1104.I'&te Realism ot Al'iatotle
into the more accurate lansuaae of Relationi ••, and
not forgetting to eoneot ita oaplial enor ot making
the unive ..aal. inhere in eaoh i.ndividual a. an 1ndividual (in re) rather than in all the 1ndiyldual.
as a groUP ~t.r HI), the meaning of hi. dootrine
18 that soleno. I.-OOneerned with the 8.,.1'&1 ••latlona of tbings rather than wi th the thinss th .....

•• lv....w1th general laws rather than with thl-pecu.
li.~itle. or acoident. or lndlyldual obJ.ot•• ~T
~u.

things would become subordinated to tne general law8 WhiCh

govern them, a directIon whlCh plainly i . oppoalte to that
taken

br

50otua.

-

35 Ibld., 3.3.
.36 Ibid., 41.
37 Ibid., 41-42.
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In aumma17 ot Abbott a 8"lt_ a .hor.er .tatement oan

hat'dly be tound than that he himselt propo ••••
ObJectivi •• in .cience take. its etand, oonsciously or unconsolously. on Relationt... It,
tundamental prinoiple 18 the law ot Objective Veritioa t1on-tIlat 008111 tlon DlUstc,ontoN i t.elt to
thing., not thing. to cognition. ~e neoesaar:r
corollary ot th1. 1a. 1. the tn.eE~abi11tl ot nou.ena and eh.no.ena, phenom'81'la lieing Se 'app'iir'Ei•• t
01 no;Mina.
n&w..na beiDl that wh14h ·app.ars'
and 1. partlal17 understood 1n p~e~.na, and iher
have th.lr 1i.'ls.p....bl. exietence, not onl" in the
mind, but also in the oosmOI whioh the mind cogni..... 'lhe only utilit" 1n retaining the distinotion at, . &11 i. to mark the dlstlnctlon between complete and 1noomplete lmov1ed,e-noumena being taken
to denote thlng.-in-them.elvee a. tne,. .xlat in &11
the oomplex1 tr ot tbei:r obj.ctlve att:r1butea and
:relatlona, andphenODlena being taken to denote tbe.e
.ame thinge-ln-them.e1v •• 80 tar only a. they are.
known 1n tneir obJectlve attribute. and relationa.
tn. linal outcome ot Icientlfl0 objectivlsm 18 a
constantl,. Srov1ng knowledge ot the real. CO.moa as
1 t 1$; 1.u whloh the human mind haa '" ts proper PlaCta
and actlvl t7 1n entire harmoDJ' wi th comical 1a"s.'"

ana

Havll3g propo.ed the theories of the two men by whom
Pelrce wu moat influenoed in hi. realism, it 1.

llOW

the oppor-

tune moment to examlne ,.lrc.'1 u •• of the•• aourc •• , and to •••
how elementa ot sootUI and Abbot found thelr way Into Pelroe-.

philosoph,..

CHAPUR IV
PEIRCE'S USE

or

SOUROD

The work. of Dun. SootU$ have 8 tronsl,. 1ntluenoecl
me. It hl. 10g10 and •• taph,..lcI, not alav1sh1,. worshipped, but torn ava,. tram 1 ts medievalism, 1)e adapted
to .od.rn cuI ture, under oontinual r_inder. ot nom1nallstlc oritic11.I, I . . convlnced that It will go tar
toward .uppl,.lng the

mont ••

wl~

phl10.~

phr.leal Iclence.

Thi. is onl,. one atatement
tion to accept

own realism.

~he

or

which ls b •• t to hu-

,

Petree t • Wblch att•• ta hi. inolina-

teaohing ot Duna scotua ae .. baala tor his

It thl. were the onl,. reterence to

alleglance to b1Dl mlght be qu•• tloned.

But the

SCOtU8t

,elrce.a

1'1._ ot scotU$

appears so tre(luentl,. 11'1 the vltlnga ot P.1rce that it 1s pla1n
that he breathed the ••r,. atmosphere of Sootl. . in hl" ~h110ao

ph,..

pelroe, .however, must not

be

construed ae adopting 8cotu.

in the context of the Middle Age., tor, al though.hehad "bMn an
attentlve and med1tat1ve .tudentff2 or the works of Dun. t he "4. .
not .ean that he Is g01ng baok to the genepal vleva of 600 year.
baok, he .erel,. .eana that the pOint ot .etaph,..loa upon Wbleh

scotu. ohletly lnstated and which haa 81n•• pa •••d

-

1 CP, 1.6.
87

~ut

ot .ind,

88
ia a varr imPortant pOint."l Hia pr.ia.

or

the SubtlAl Doctor

Is, nevertheless, almost w1thout bounds, tor Peirce considers
him as the one representative of scholasticism 1n whom he was
personally interested.

In Pe1rce's estimation, "the metaphysic.

of Aquinas, a modlfied Aristote11an1sm, had b.en immensely
e1abo:rated and d••ply transformed by the vast logic-a1 genius

ot the Briti.h Duns scotuSt"4 who was "one ot the greateat
metaphysicians ot all ttme."$

In 1893 Pei:roe oould write.

flyet be it known that never. during the thirty years 1n which
I have been writing on philosophical questions, have I tailed
in my allegianoe to realistic opInions and to oerta1n Scotistic
ideas_"6 Whethe:r th1s strict adherence to Soot1.tic teaching
continued through the rea t ot hi. lite is an interesting point
that will ba commented on presently.
In traCing the elements ot Scott. tIc realism which
",are the occasion ot s1milar doctrines in Peirce, there 18 no
way in Which it 18 pos8ible to ba absolutely certain that Pelroe
de~lved

any specltlctheory trom hi. study ot one

philosopher.

Allthat can be done is to indicate certain log!-

c",paralle1., and draw the interenoe that

3

particula~

g. 4.$0.

-

4 CP, 2.166.
5 OF, 4.28.
6 CP. 6.605.

-

Pel~oe

had conceived,

or at l .... t worked out, the ide.. under the intluence of his
reading 1n the history ot philosophy_
What are the teature. or 3cotiam, then, that attracted
?eirce?

It must be remembered that scotus was not the only

scholastic with Whom Peiroe was acquainted, tor he va. tamiliar
w~th

st. frhoMAs and others or tbe Middle Ages. but never went

out of his way::o honor them with the meed of praise.

T.hererore,

elements must be singled out which are characteristically scotl.tic, and which the other systems as a general rule are lack1ng.
Scotu.' most distinctlve realistic teaching centera
around the common nature and the haecc.ity, .s has been shown in
the last chapter.

Peirce aaw in these two idea.s many thinga

which appealed to him, and aome ot the conclusions he reached
reflected this knowledge.

First ot all it will profit to look

at Peirce's dootrine on universals, or rather, generals, tor he
rarely used the other ter.m. 7

Then some reatures ot haGceeiv"

which interested him can be delved into.
Peirce. from his study ot science in tneory and practice, bad learned to reject nominalism 1n tavorot reallsm.
But

he did not wish to make theoapi til mlstake of going too

7 Feibleman gives this rea.on: uPeirce preferred to
call his universals generals in order to ahow that he d.1d not
mean them to be anything absolute 01" final, an advance over
Kant .s well as over Abbot." Introduction to Peirce)s Phl1oso~~:r.

SO.

•-

..
other

far in the
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directIon, and ending up with an extreme real-

ism which 'tIOUld be only another torm of nominali am.

Therefore

he wanted to assert that his general. were real, but yet not

the "really real," to borrow the Platonic phrase.

He round a

means to IncorpoJliate the.e tacts in his realism th:rough Scotus t
teaching on the oommon nature, which is the intelligible content ot the universal, pr8.cindlng from .i ther singular or un!vere ..l existenoe.

This common nature does not merely exiat

in partioular things, as the Aristotelians say, nor is it subsiatent in it.elt as Plato wished.

Rather, it haa ita ovn sub-

jective unity, being neither a pur. intellectual fiction, nor
exi.ting Objectively in the world of nature as an individual.
Thi. objective unity

ot the ComDton nature, 1II.lich nevertheless

is leas than numerical uni ty, mak.. it an integral part ot the
real world.

Thus Peiroe va8 able to affirm. that his generals

had some reality, and he.till managed to avoid PlatoniC reali.lIl,
a charge that Feibleman vished to lay at hi. doorstep

a8

was

•• en above.
'!hu. tar Peirce may .eem to be in broad agreement with
eoholastic realism, at l ... t .a proposed by Duns scotus.

But

there is this important ditterenoe in his way ot considering
the general Which must be taken into account.

For Scotus, ••

tor all the scholasticl, the thought required to apprehend the
univeraal i. that

or

the indlvldu.lntellect, and thi. appre.

hension 1. the result ot the nec••sary )mowledge ot being.

91
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Peirce changes this picture oonsiderably, tor the thought Whioh
grasps the reality ot the general is that ot the community ot
minds employing the method ot scientIfIc Inquirr throughout an
unlimited perIod of time. S Theretore anyone individual's appre.
hen.ion of a general is not necessary, but probabl_ only, and
stand. to be conec ted by what succeeding minds w1l11.00.e to
know of the same general.

It is when Pe1rce talks of elements derived trom haeceeity, though, that his dependence upon Sootus becomes quite
marked.

Aristotle and st. Thomas Aquinas, making the principle

of individuation unknowable matter whioh give. the individual
its numerical unity, lett the somewhat anomalous aituation of
the individual being constItuted through something which eould
not ot it••lf be known.

This view ot Aristotle and the schol-

astica vas predominant during the early Middle Ag.s, leaving the
indi't'idual a ,omeWhat vague ent! ty" in WhIch the universal form
was the thing that was accentuated.

peiree did not lIke to

8 se., tor example, OP, 5.311: nThe real, then, Is
that Which, sooner or later, lrilOP.mation and reasoning would
final17 re,u1t tn, and which is therefore independent ot the
vagaries of me and you. Thua, the very origin ot the conception ot l'ea1it7 shows that this conception e.o.nti&11,. involves
the notion ot a COMMUNl'l'Y, w1 thout dat1ni te 11m! ta, and capable
ot a definite increase ot knowledge. n
See also CP, 2.654n. Where he aa.,.8' "I do not here
admit an absolutely Unknowable. Evidence Gould ,how us what
would probably be the ca.. after an,. given l.pse ot time, and
though' a subsequent time mIght be as.igned which that evidence
might not cover, yet further evidence would cover it."
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have the l"eal1 ty ot the individual thus subordinated to the
reali ty ot the universal, and in Scotus he tound a way 1n which
the realism of actual pal"ticulal"s could be made equal to that
ot generals without losing at the same time the generality of
his realism.

Thus Scotua' teaching according to which the in-

dividual i8 constituted by a positive entity in its individuality
allowed Peirce to restore the emphasis on the reality ot the
individual without giving up the reality ot generals.
But haecce1tJ has tal" more implioat1ons in Peirce ••
philosophy than the one already de.cribed.

A passage combining

the neeesa1t.y ot something to make the general idea particularized in each subject, together wlta a rejection ot an overzealous adoption of extl"eme realism, is the following:
An indexical. word, web. . . a propel" noun or
demonstrative or .elective pronoun, haa .toree to
draw the attention ot the listener to some heoceity
common to the experience ot speaker and listener.
B.1 a hecce1ty, I mean, some el..ent ot existence
Which, not merely by the 11kene.s between its dlfterent apparltiona, but by an inward torce ot Identity, manitesting it.elt in the continuity of its
apparition throughout time and in space, is distinct
trom eve 17 thing e18e, and 1s thus tit (a. it can in
no other way be) to ~ec.lve a proper name or to be
indicated
th.Is or that. Contrast this with the
slgnitication-or-the verS, which is sometimes in
rq thought, sometimes in yours, and which has no
other identity than the agreement between it ••everal
manitestations. That is what we oall an abstraction
or idea. 'Ibe nominalists 8a7 it i. a mere name.
strike out the f.ere t and this opinion 1. approxlmate17 'Wue. The realist. say :1 t is real. Substitute tor '1s,- ma~., that is,-r. pro.ided experience and reason .;Il, aa their-rlnal upshot,
uphold the truth of the particular predioate, and
the natural existence ot the law it expressea, and

.s
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thi. 1. likewise true, It 18 certalnl7 a great
mi.take to look upon an 1dea, merel becau.e it
haa not the mode ~ existence ot a eocelt7. as
a 11tel... thing.

t

In the oateg0!7 ot Seoondn••• are round the greateat resem-

blances to haeccelty, top Se.oDdness i. tact, aa haa been shown,
and tact 1a aomething "pertectly indivIdual.

It happens here

and now. ,,10

Again Pe1roe declarea.
In truth, any tact is 1n one .en•• ultimate-that la
to say, in 1ta lsolated aggre •• ive stubbornne.s and
ind1vIdual realIty. What ScotU8 calls the haecc.ltie.
ot thlngs, the hereneas and nowne.a ot, them, are ind••d ul t1u te. 'Why this whioh la here i. luch a. 1\
ia, how, tor instance, it it happens to be a grain
ot .and, it oame to be 80 amall and 80 hard, 'We can
askJ we can a180 ask how 1t got carrIed here, but
the explanatIon 1n this ea .. merely carri•• us back
to the tact that 1t waa once 1n 80me other pla.e,
where s1ml1alt thingl m1ght naturall,. be expeoted
to be. 'Why I7'. independentl,. ot 1ts general chaNOter., com.s to have &D7 definite place in the world,
is not a ClHstlon to be asked, 1 t 1s Ilmpll an ul ti.
mate tact.

Poundationa

to~

Peirce'. doctrine ot chance are also

round in thi. t.aohing ot seotua.

Every explanation. tor in-

stanoe, or the moon'lI path, a phenomenon tha t _1 aeem to l'.st
indubitably upon universal, intlexible prInCiples, must take
particular existenoe. and events into con.ideration betore the

9

-ep. ).460.
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general law

can

be to~ulated.

Such original or underlved In-

diTiduallt,y and d1.er81t7 18 preoisell what Petree means b1
Ohance,12 and trom this point ot view ohance, springing trom
the individuality ot each partioular event, 1s prior to law,

as was explained at the end ot chapter two.
In the ph.ses ot Peirpe' a realism Just outlined it i.
possIble to traoe definite pOints ot oommunity with Scotistic
But an underl.,ing

metaphysics.

present,

Whi~

c~nt

ot dIsagreement is a180

WOUld indicate 01 ther that Petrce dId not under-

stand Scotu. tully, or that he broke away trom h1m unCI.". aome

other Intluenoe.

T.bIa latter

h1PO~e8is

.eems to be the better

ot the two, especlall., when account 1s taken ot the taet that
Peirce i8 18.8 magnanimous in his praise ot Seotus during the
year8 following 1900.

In 190) he writ.s that he calls h1mselt

"an Aristotelian ot the scholastic wing, approachIng Sootlsm,
but gOing much further in the diHctlon ot scholastic realism, ,,13
&s though he disapproved ot Duns tor not teaching the tullnes.

at scholastic rea11.m.

The same rear he states:

re.pects must it be suppo.ed that
in ScOtu8 or 1n Kant.

ffNop in other

r ....nt to everythIng either

We all commit our blundera. H14

By 190$

his criticism 18 more pOinted, tor he had came to suspect Scotus

12

-el,

6.612.

-CP, 6.9$.

13 CP, $.71n.
14

-

~

ot Inourrlng the one oharge that alva.,. mad. 'elrce ••• red,
"1 ultimately oame to approve ot the opInions ot

nuns,

I think he inoline. too muob toward. nominalism •• 1S

although

In 1909 h.

openly dltfer. tPOll Sootua In interpreting haeceei ty to contON
wi 1m hi. pragmatici .., but he tri•• to sa7 that hla mean1ng Is

what Scows "., r8a11., driving at.
It [the correlate ot a relation] is existent, in that
1 ts' being doea not oonal.t In any iuilltIe., but in
Ita ettect.--ln Ita aotuall., acting and being acted
on, 80 long a. tbi. actIon and sutterlng endures.
Thoae Mba experience It. etteota pero.ive and know
It In ~t aotlon, and just that constItute. Its very
being. It Is not in perceiving it. qualitle. that
the., know it, but in hetting It. 1n.latency tben and
there, whIch nun. oalled Ita haecceltaa--Dr, It he
dldn·t, it waa thIs he waa groping afier. 1b

'elrce evidentl., wa. attempting to mold Sootl.m to tIt
the reall.tlc philosophy whIch he thought was nec•• aary to uphold
the reall8m ot .cienoe.

HIs reason tor borrowing tram both

Sootus and Abbot Is well .%pHased by Felbleman,

"'!'hi. demand

[tor a philosophy ot solence] Peirce tound adequately supplied
by the realIstic philosophy of Duns Sootua.
Peirce had learned that .clenee vas realistic
~all.tloJ
~ad

From

Abbot's work

~ather

than no.m1-

but, aa Peirce himselt saId, it was Dun. scotus who

ahowed him exaotly Mbat kind of realism was conformable

1S £!,
16 g,

1.560.

6.318.

11 Introduction!! 'eiroe'a Philoaoehz.
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~itn scienc.: MI7 AbbOt's contribution to the formation of
pelrce's realism, then, was tne clear

to~ul.tlon

ot the real-

Istic Vinclpl•• on whioh science rested,IS and its need tor a

realistic philosophy to glve tormal:8upport to the 1nv•• tigationa
it had been carrying on independently of philosophy_

Peirce took trOll Abbot. but the. elaboration WElS hi.
he va. the tirst modern philosophical advooate

or

'Ibis much
Q1ftl,

tor

the realistio

character of aci.nce po •••• sing autticlent technlcal knowledge
l
to be able to de.rend the posltion. '

Peirce'. theory of Thlrdnesa, or law, has definite
ele. .nts of Abbott .. 8clentlfl0 reall_ In 1 t.

For 8cience

starta with Inductlons to erect hypothe.e., which are then tested by observations, and; 1t round valid, uaed .. s a baala tor
deductions.

Thus the existence ot universal princlples or laws

18 required., laws. moreover, which are independent of an,. person
or collection ot peraona having knowledge ot' th_-a oapital

pOint In Peirce t s theory.

1hese laws, to go .. step turther,

ape not absolute, are not mere aummarles ot known tacta, but
alao are tinder. of new ones.

1hus sclence has come to be

tOl"

18 CP, 4.1. "Dr. Abbot 1n bla Soientific f,ne1s. hal
'0
olearl,. andwlth auch admi:rable simpl!cl!y Shown tliaf modern
science 1. realistic that It le perhaps Injudicious tor me to
attempt to add an,.th1ng upon the subject. M

SO'.

..
peiroce not only a
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study or tacta 1n and tor their own sake, but

alao a search tor the lawa demanded bY' the taots and inclusive
of them. 2O RaHin can be seen a rea.on tor the Ihitt rrom
striot scholasticism to a mod1tied
the relationi.a outlined by Abbot.

to~

ot it Which include.

For it tact.

~.

not

~o be

the prime lntere.t, then Peirce would not be conoerned so much
about a static un1vepsal Which existed in each particular thing

.a

he would be 1n oonnecting th••• things together to arrive at

a general law which would govern tbe relations of thaM to one

another, op, in other words, 1n arriving at the universal relationa between things.

Peirce attributes the advances made in

modern science. over those made In ancIent precl.elj" to the
tact that an increased knowledge of the relations of things

haa been acquired:
The words • cause' and teffect' atill linger, but the
old conoeptions have been dropped trom meohanical
phl1oaoph,., tor the fact now known is that in certain relative positions bodieaundergo certa1n .cc.l ....
erationa. Now an acceleration. instead of being like
.. veloclt,. a rel.tiont between two 8ucceuive poslti(l1s,
i8 a relat10n;' between tbre., so that the new doctrine
has conaiated 1n the suitable introduction ot the oon-

20 OP, 1.1. nTh•• , in brlef, mJ phl10sophy mal" be
described
~ attempt of a physiCist to make such conjectures
aa to the conati tution of the univerae as the method. ot science
may permit, with the aid of all that has been don. by previous

a.

philosophers. I ahall supp"rt my propos! tlons by suoh argument.
as I can. nemonst:rative proot i . not to be thought ot. '!he demonst:ratlons at the metaphysicians are all moonShine. f-ne best
that can be done is to suppl,. a h1P0th.Si8, not devoid or all
likelihood, in the general line of g:rowth of scientifio Ideaa,
and capable at being verified or reluted by future observers."
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...

ception ot th~een.a.. On tnis idea, tne whole ot
modern phy.lcs 1s buIlt. The superiorIty- ot modern
geometrJ, too, haa certaInly- been due to nothing 80
much as the brIdging ot the innumerable dl. tIne tea•••
wi th which enolent science vu enoumb.~.dJ and we lD&J
go so tar as to sa,. that all the g~eat stepa In the
method ot scienoe In .very department have con.isted
in bringing into relatIon eaae. p~evlouel7 discrete. 21
In brief f'01"111, than. "Iarioue phase. ot Peirce'lS realism

which aeem to have been occasioned by elementa
and Abbot he•• been enumerated.

d~wn

trom $cotus

The Ide. of the general as

being something Hal In the vOl"ld, wIthout having the ultimate
l"eallt.ywhlch belongs only to indIviduals 18 well taken care ot
by Sootu. t common nature and haeccel ty.
ove~,

Th1s]A at factor, more-

i8 carried out 1n 'elrce-a continual insistence on the

absolute imperativeness ot the oat0801'1 ot Secondne •• , and in
his principle ot chance which demands that the indiv1dual
even ta be all oonsidered betore the un1"eraal law 18 tONU.lated. 22 From Abbot ,eiree learne" that scienee depends upon
the.e general'ftlat1ona, tor the conception of dlatinct things

not standing in relation to one another 1a a.na.l.aa, and would
lead ul timatel,. to ao11palam.

But Peirce advance. on the .. ide.a..

and states that the cognitIon ot universals cannot be nece.8&r1,
since they arEt continually being further determ1ned and deve-

22 Which even then remalns only a general law admitting of development, and Is not strictly- universal.
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loped.

But this is a wrinkle Peiroe himself worked out. not

to be attributed to either Scotus or Abbot, and it will be lett
tor the last chapter in Which a judgment will be paased on the
realism ot Peirce, both in relation to th••• sources, and in
itaelt.

OHAPTER'

EVALUATIO. OF PEIRCEt! SOHOLASTIC REALISM
NOW

tnat Peirce'. doctrine on rea118m haa been ex-

plained with reference to its aource. in scotua and Abbot, 1t
18 t1me to pas.

3ud~.nt

and to evaluate hi. 87stem ot rea11••

in the 11ght of scholaatic principle., to whioh he a1. way.
olaimed faithful adheren.e.

This taak is not an easy one, tor

Pelrce la not lacking in Go.curl trf even on poln t8 about which
he apeak. frequently_
Peirce can hardl,. b. said to have begun a complete
revolution by hi. teaching on realism.

NO man haa ever b.en

independent ot hi. predecessors in evolving a dootrine, and
Peirce, powerful and original thinker though he vaa, resembled
other great men in that he belong. to a detinite tradit1on.
Reid and Hamilton had declared for reallsm in Gr•• t Britain

the century betore, and Peirce vas well aware of their work.
Beaide., aa haa been a.en, he re11ed on the r.aliat1c doctrine

of the acholastics to a verr high degree.

Theretore he dId

not excogitate hi. realism una1ded by the philosophy ot the
past.

Hi. glory, rather, liea 1n thiS, that he argued strongly

tor a realiatic philosophy at a time when America was reeling
100

..
very much the
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intluence ot the nineteenth century idea11at10

and subJectivistio phl1osophies ot Hegel, per8onallam, evolutionism, and absolute ideali8m.

To Peirce, and to Abbot, goes

the honor ot s •• lng that seience would contradlct Itself once
It had denied the obJectlvity ot relations.

ne aaw that the

ant1quatlon ot Arlstotle'a physios was no reason for throwing
away the tlne bedrock ot reality, loglc, and metaphysics v.h!oh
are actually the bases

tOI'

any ph,.sics whatever-"

And s.eing

that, he strove hi. utmost to bring these realistlc principles

back into philosophioal reapectabili ty atter tour centur-!e. ot
That he dld not succeed in hls day wal due to un-

diarepute.

tortunate circumstance. ot obscur-ity and lack ot influence
beyond his control, that his realist1c principle. and logic
are having Influence today upon philosophers ot aU sohool.

ls supreme evidence ot thelr intrinsic

wor~,

and a

t •• ttmo.n7

that Pelrce was a generation ahead ot h1s time in his phllo80phlcal tendenoie••

Peirce, theretore, advocated a realistic phllosoph7
far ahead ot his contemporarIes, the question that this the.i.
wlshe. to an.wer, however, 18 precise17 what kind ot rea11sm
Pelrca had.

It has been shown In ohapter two that he dld have

a true realism, and not me:-ely a phenomenal IdealIsm, 1Ihlch
contuaes the real thing. wl th the men tal appearance. ot them
when the,. are known.

But Pelroe ola1.m.ed

1IOpe

than a mere pas.inc

grade in the subJeot ot ;peall., he claimed to have gone back to
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the scholastics, to Duns Scotua in partioular, and to have
evolved a scholastic reall.m that would tit modern soienoe.
Is this last claim ot his Justified, and it not. why not?
1nis, as 1s evident. Is the nub of this the.l., and to avo1d
the quest10n would be to leave the work undone.

That Peiroe dld have'm&qy atr1nitie. to .chola.ticlam
.s proposed by Scotus ia plain from the last ohap tel' and n.ed
not be proved agaln.

But, a. hinted at previously, there are

also pl'otound ditterences.

There are three prinoipal oount.

on whioh Peiroe-" interpretation ot the generaldif.rel'.

tl'OlI.

the soholaatics' universal, and on each ot these it will be .een
that the d1tterence. are tundamental and irreooncilable.

The scholastics, and scotus was no
held that the basis tor the universal was to

.~oeption

be

in thia,

tound in the

substantial form or •••enee ot the thing, thus malting the univeraal depend on something intrins1c to the being, indeed on the
thing most intrinsic to it, ita quIddity_
mental to soholasticism a180,

fo~

Thia point 18 funda-

a man 1s not called a man be-

.aus. he act. in a certain way, but merit. the

p~.dicate

becaus.

he has a certain nature, whether he placea any acts or not.

1he

.econd point of tn. scholastic theory trom which Peirce d1ffers
1. that the operations flow trom a being _.oauae a being i .

determined by its torm to act 1n such and such a way, and there.
tore the regularity, acoording to the achola.ties, MUst be sought
In the torm, and not merely in the eft.fta

O~

hab1t of

o~eration
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a. ,uGh.

Lastly, the lohoolmen held that the universal was

apprehended by the lndividual intellect and gave a n .. es8&17
knowledge ot being.
Measuring Petree'. general agalnat the.e oriteria,
.&veral ditterences emerge immediatel,..

FIrat of all. the

fundamentu.!el! tor hi. general i . not the qulddItJ ot a
thing, buS rather the way tbe thing operate.,l or 1ta habit

ot action, something which 1. partially determined, but which
wIll .tl11 admit ot further determination .s 1t develop..

Peiroe

had no other choice, tor with hi. prinCiple of chanee he could
hardly .ettle upon fQmetnlng tlx.d aa tne foundation tor hi.
general and at the aame tlme retain an explanation tor the ohange
and

development In things.

With the operation of a th1ng tor

the baaia tor the general, however, he eould allow tor tn. chance
happening whIch would be the beginning ot a new habit, and thu.

ot a new general a8 the thing, accord1ng to 1tl ne. habit, was
now related to other thing. in a new vay.
Secondly. Peirce, inatead ot s.eking a

natu~~ ~ieh

would be the principle ot operationa under investigation, wa.

rather inclined to place the total reality ot the general 1n
the operation it •• lt and it. relation to otiber things.

But aa

1 S.e CP, 1.210: "~e predicate, hardn••• , i. not
invented b7 .en, 'ii the word i8, but 18 really ana truly in the
hard things and is one 1n them all, aa a de.cription ot habit,
disposition, or behavior." Note eapecially the last phrase.
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long a8 Peirce retused to look into the principle of the

ope~a

tIon, scholastics would say that he dId not have an adequate
explanation for the phenOlllena, and therefore did not have autfieient foundatIon tor his systam.
th.~

As was shown 1n ohapter two,

i . a dispute Whether Peirce held that there i. a Bubstanc.

underlying accidents Or not.

It may be that he di.regarded or

overlooked the question ot substance, satisfied with the atrirmation that the accidents were real, but this could hardly

atto~d

an ultimate explanation ot the accidents, and it is thl.s that
philosophy Should give.
As tor the 1.st tactor, Peirce denied that the universal 1s apprehended by the individual intellect and resulted
in nec •• s&1"'1 knowledge, but maintained instead that the general

i8 grasped by the community of minds employing the method ot
acient!tic inquiry throughout an unlimited period ot time.

The

scholastics. nece.s.17 knowledge of the unohanging universal
baa yIelded the tield to mere probable knowledge

ot • general

Which i8 continually becoming more and more pertect.
Having shown that the interpretation given by Peirce
on th ••• three questions 1. Qthe!" than that ot the scholastlca,
the question might arise whether these elements are essential
to Peirce f • S7.t8ml or afle accidental and could be abandoned
w.J.tbout harming his realism .a luch.

A ahort revie" ot SOme

ot the prinoiple. on whlch Peirce baled his phIlosoph,. might

..
vas by evolution,

10$
especially Lamarckian evolution whioh is based

on the evolving of habits through chance occurrenoes, Peirce

placed much weight on the principles ot continuity and chance.
The one holda tor a continual progress in nature from the lowest
up to the higheat, trom matter to mind.

The principle ot chanoe

(tor through chanoe oocurrences.new habits aris.) gives a sutflcient rea. on tor the regularlt,. tound in nature. tor onoe a
thlng haa happened 1n one way rather than In another, a habit
18 set up according to which ..ctions in the fuwre are llkel,.
to take place.
From this br1er aummary of 80me of the underlying
pre.upposltlons that Pelrce took tor granted, It ls eas1 to aee
that the theory of the general .a presented above i8 essent1al
to

hi. .7stam, tor he oannot poaslbly have a tixed foundation

tor hi. general as long as he holds a principle of chance demanding the opportunlty for some po.sible future variation.
1he same criticism would hold againat hi. negleot to evolve a
doctrine on substance, tor an evolutioniatie philosophy, while
not nece.aarily denying t1xed natures of things, f1nda the path
much smoother it th1s q.ueation can be ignox-ed.

Aa for only

probable lmOldedge ot the general in Peirce'a theo17, this nee•• .arl1,. tollow. from the tact that at anJ particular moment the
general is not yet tully evolved, and therefore could not result
in a neoessary knowledge ot being tor the individual intellect.
Only at 80me tu ture time,. when the .volu tlon will have been com-

pleted,

..
can the communltr of mind. hope
But, if

Pel~cets
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to know general ••

universal Is not one common nature

whlch can be predioated of man., indivlduals slngly and univocally, does he .,.et reta1n a realism'

n:. argue. vehementl,.

he doe8, and his argument seems to have genuine worth.

that

He take.

the operatlon ot a natural lav,- the law of gravitation, to exem-

pllfy his th.ory_

Prom o....rwh.lmlng experienoe In the past that

unaupport.d atone. tall fr •• ly,. _n necessarily ltuppo .......ven
more, he knovs-that th18 atone, 1f pelea.ed, will tall.

this knowledge can oome trom two h1Pothe....

Nov

Either the uni-

tormity with which tho.e stones have tallen In the past haa
been due to mere chance, and .riord. no ground whatever tor
thinking that this .tone vll1 tall, or the

~itorm1 ty

v1 th which

the .ton.s have fallen haa been due to some active principle
1fhIch i ... general, in Which ca.e It would be a .trange coln-

cldence that it .hould oe •• e to act at the mament mr pr.diotion
was based on it. 2 Peiroe oontinue ••

ot cour.e, eve1")" sane man vill adopt the latter
hypothesis. It he could doubt It in the caae ot the
atone--~1oh he can't-.and I maya. well drop tb.
atone Onee tor all--1 told you sol--!t anybody doubt.
thl. still, a thousand otber suoh induotive prediction.
are getting .er1tled everr dar, and he will have to
suppo.. eye17 one ot them to be merely tortul tous in
order reasonably to eaoape the conolua1on that
1nCil'le. are reall, ~erativ. In nature.
\in.Pal
at fa 58 aoc£rrn. of scno aa Io rEtaIiii.'

y

I

2

•

r

st,

S.100.

3 CP, 5.101.
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..
Theretol'$.

al thOUgh the general 18:ltOt the nece.,uil,.

known tor.m Which the leholaaticl conceived, it neverthele•• 1.
rooted in real 1 t'1 and haa real meaning.

It 1s a saneral law

or mode of aoting to whlch thing. contorm.
Abbott. worda, an obJeotive relation

~loh

It 1., to put it 1n

holda good between

th1ng. and on whloh our knowledge ot them 1. ba.ed.
Here, then, i . a vide end fundamental divergence trom

the acholaaticla ot Scows.
enc.'

was Peirce aware ot this dlttep-

It aeems that he va., tor

.a

haa b.en noted In the 1.at

ohapter, after he explained haeeeeit,. to conform with hl. prag-

matic norm, he .tate. that thi. i . what Scotus meant, it he did
not actuall,. mean it.

An even DlOre convincing proot

that Peirce

aaw dltterence' between hi. doctrine and Scotta Is the tollW1ng

pa.sage, which also shows that 'elroe recognized Abbot as the
aoure. trom whioh the divergence at ...ed.

trom other
.pecie. 1., first, lts retention ot a puritled philosophy• •econdly, It. full •• ceptanee of the main bOdy
ot our inatinctive belleta, and thirdly, its strenuous
inaistence upen the truth of a.holastic I'eallam (01' a
cloae approxtmatlon to that, well-stated b,. the late
Dr. Franeis Ellingwood Abbot in the IntJlOduction W
his Seient1tio Th.i ... )~
But What diatingulp.e. 1 t [pragmatici. .)

Again Peirce aaY8.

--

"I am mY8elt a .eholas tio I'ealist ot a

.~ewhat e~tl'~e 8tr128."; With this evidence it i8 plain that

-

4 CP, 5.4235 CP, 5.470. Italics not in the

-

original.

.
peirce had not tooled hlmaelt 1nto thInking that his
was exactl,. the same as scotus'.
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reall. .

pe:rhaps the reason wh7 he

conttnued to lay cla1m to a soholastio peal ism at all waa tn.t
he conoeived himself a. "taking the point ot .etaphysics upon
which scotua &:h1e.tly tnalated,- without ttgoing back to the
general view. ot 600 yeara b&ck. n6

B7 so doing, he would not

be "slavishly 'Wor8hlpp1ng" the logic and metaphyslcs ot D\UUl
sootus, but would bave "adapted it to mode:rn oulture. fl7 What...
ever the anawer--whetber Peirce thought that hi. modificationa
pt Scotiaa still allowed him to remaIn wi thIn the pal. ot

acholastic thought or not--lt seem8 certain tnat he in tact
proposed a s7stam oontrarr to 8ebolaatlc princlples on univep.
aallty and general1t7. tor 1n denying the scholastic notion ot
subetanoe and 4ulddlty as the ba81a tor hi. ganeral, he 1....
voeahly .eparated h1maelt trom true scholastio realiam.
One last consideration yet remains tor surveillance.
Doe. Peiroe f • theory of un1versals, sinoe not exaotly identioal
wltb soholastic moderate reali.m, verge more towards .xtreme

reallam or toward. nominal!.'

In other word., are PeIrce's

generale more real or le.s real than the sCholastice' un1wereate'
The universal nature tor the soholastic Is derived

from

..
the form,
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tn. act, ot the being, and of itself denotes

only pertectlon.

It must, ot course, be r ••• lved into matter

to exist and to be indlviduated,S but the matter glv•• only
the individuality of the being, and in no way contributes to
causing the being to have thi. or that form.

Peirce, worklng wIth an evolutionisti. world which
i . continually progressIng from the somewhat impertect atate

at tn.e beginning to Its full actualisation, had a dIfferent

view.

In the primItive chaotio state of the world the forms

were all immer.ed in the amoI'ph.oua maa. ot _tter which conatituted the origin of thing..

'.!b..n, a. t1me went on, the forms

began to evolve them••l ..... from the matter

~ough

the principle.

ot chance and continuity, r.aehing atter higher and higher mod••
ot perteetion.

At some period in the indet1n1tely tar

tu~re,

a poInt which the oommunity ot mInds will 1me,.." but which no
indIvidual here and

nOW

can know, the •• torm. will have fullJ'

evolved, and wl11 be tully actuali••d.

But until noh time tha,.

-

ere ,. till in the proce.. ot formalIzation, ao to apeak, and &a

.!!!!!

are baaed nct on.l7 on aot but al.o have potentiality in-

trinaecall,. connected with them. a potentlallt,v whleh vl11 be
fulfilled

~en

the form 1. tull,. actualized.

8 At le.at aeco~d1ng to the ~oml.tic doctrine. But
even tor Scotus the common nature i . the torm, or Itrietlr In the
line ot act, to WbI~h haecoeit,. com•••a the la.t actualitT
betore the indivldual is constItuted in being. In neither
t •• do the note. ot the unival-••l contaIn poten.tlal.lty.

s,..-

.
It would
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theretore seem that pel:rce aocords le ••

realIty to the univ.rsal

scholastlcs, tor inasmuch

t~an ~e

as he allows the unlversal to embraee potentiality, he place.
In it an element ot unlmowabillty.

And.a an :idea can repl'esEJnt

the real only ina.much .e it Is knowable, the un! versal of the
scholastics 1. better su:ited to portraying objective reallty

than the g.neral ot peirce, aince everything in the universal
i . knowable, While aomething in the general must nece.aarily

remain unknowable.
'!h.se, then, must
theory ot Haliam.

be the

final judgments ot Peirce' I

Although he doe. pos.eas a tl"'Ue :reallsm,

and thus serv.. as • butter against the nominalism and idealism

ot the many philosophers who preceded him trom the ttme ot De.c8l'tes, he certainly do.s not pos.... the schol•• tic realism to
which he laid cla1m.

The principal reason tor the ditterence

was the laboratory-trained mind ot peirce .. who, al though genu-

tnely trying to establish
ove~ram1l1a~it7

this t.sk.

8.

metaphysics, was prevented by hi.

with the methods of solence trom accompliah1ns

Hi. soientlfic .ense ot arrlving at an exact goal

only at some date tar in the tutuH obtuscated for him the truth
that the mind has here and now the intuItIonal power ot understanding certain th1ngs elearl.,.

Hia roundations in evolution-

iltic theoX7 and 1n the principles ot chance and continuity

rendered his general incapable ot be1ng known by the individual
intellect.

:the general, being bound up with an .:Ie ment of

Ul
potentia11 t1~ 1s theretore le.8 xaeal than the universal of the

general principles which are reall7 operative in nature.

sOholastica, although it Itlll 1. real, tor it represents
,

In

denying Peirce the title of scholastIc realilt one must not
den,. him hIs greatest achievement.
801118

that of having atta1ned to

sort of reall_ in ttl. mldat ot the subJectlylat1c philo-

aophlcal surroundings in 'Wh1ch he 11ved and worked.
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